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A Secure Web Gateway, according to Gartner’s definition, is a solution that
provides URL filtering, malicious code detection and blocking, and application
controls for cloud applications to filter out objectionable software/malware in
outbound Internet traffic generated by end-user devices and has the capability
to enforce corporate policy and regulatory compliance [1]. Its predecessor -
Web proxy - has been around since the beginning of the Web and evolved to
meet the needs of a fast-changing Web ecosystem. Traditionally, Web proxy
servers have been used to fulfil the following requirements: 1) Enable several
machines to share a single Internet connection; 2) Improve Web performance
and save bandwidth by caching repeatedly-accessed content locally; 3) Provide
a basic URL filtering capability. However, these capabilities are no longer
sufficient to meet the requirements of today’s Web ecosystem. Firstly, with
the development of Network Address Translation in the late 1990s, the needs
to use proxy servers to share an Internet connection has been superseded.
Secondly, caching does not improve performance much for mobile clients, and
mobile traffic volume has already exceeded that of desktop’s [2, 3]. Thirdly,
a Web content filter based on using a URL database cannot keep up with the
growth of Internet traffic [4]. In addition, it has become difficult to detect
and stop threats such as Botnet and Advanced Persistent Threat [5] because
of: 1) The polymorphic characteristics of the threats; 2) The increasing use
of encryption on the Web; 3) The increase in threats targeting end-users - the
weakest link; 4) The increasing need to use a variety of end-user devices from
multiple locations such as the BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE (BYOD) policy
requirement. Hence, there is an imminent need to evolve from the current Web
proxy solution to a Secure Web Gateway solution. This research provides a
categorisation of the key factors in building a Secure Web Gateway, proposes a
reference design and architecture, a practical implementation for a home vDSL
connection and finally, a testing framework that can be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of a Secure Web Gateway deployment.
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Glossary
Advanced Persistent Threat According to US National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST), APTs have the following characteristics:
1) Attackers usually hold sophisticated levels of expertise and significant
resources; 2) Attackers achieve their objectives by using various attack
vectors such as physical, deception and cyber; 3) The objectives of at-
tacks are to impede critical aspects of an organisation or exfiltrate infor-
mation or prepare themselves to execute these objectives in the future;
4) APT attacks usually last a long period accompanied with repetitive
attempts; 5) APT attacks will adapt to defenders’ countermeasures; 6)
APT attacks usually maintain the level of access required to carry out
their objectives [6].
Botnet A network of computers compromised by infestation of malicious soft-
ware and controlled by malicious users without their owners’ knowledge.
Bring Your Own Device BYOD policy is a policy that enables employees
to use their personally-owned devices such as tablets, smartphones or
laptops to access privileged information and applications in the work-
place.
Command and Control (C2) This term is commonly used in computer se-
curity and the context of cyber warfare. It refers to the ability the at-
tacker has to influence a group of compromised computers under his/her
control.
Cross-site Scripting XSS is a technique used by attackers to inject malicious
client-side script into a trusted website. Hence, the malicious code is run
vii
by unsuspecting users. This usually happens when a vulnerable web
application does not validate or encode the input it takes from users and
use that input directly within the output it sends to users.
Data Loss Prevention DLP is a business strategy to prevent users from
transferring sensitive or critical information outside the corporate net-
work either inadvertently or deliberately.
Domain Generation Algorithm DGAs is commonly used by malware to
generate a large number of domain names that can be used by infected
computers to access their command and control servers. Malware that
depends on a pre-defined list of domain names or IP addresses can be
blocked quickly so that DGA is used to circumvent the detection.
Fast-Flux Fast-Flux is a technique to circumvent security controls by as-
signing multiple (hundreds or even thousands) IP addresses to a domain
name. These IP addresses are changing with an extreme frequency, using
a combination of round-robin IP addresses and a very short Time-To-Live
(TTL) for DNS records. The goals are not only to hide the websites that
used to download malware but also to ensure that compromised systems
controlled by attackers have the best possible bandwidth and service
availability [7].
Intel Software Guard Extensions SGX is a set of new CPU instructions
that allows user-level code to be put into a private region of memory,
called enclave that is protected from other processes running at higher
privilege levels such as processes run by the computer administrators or
malware.
Internet Content Adaptation Protocol ICAP as specified in RFC 3507
is a lightweight HTTP-like protocol that has been used to extend the
capabilities of transparent proxy servers. The proxy server first accepts
and holds the connection to be inspected by another solution such as DLP
or Virus Scanning. Then the proxy server uses ICAP to pass the request
to the other solution for inspection, and the other solution returns its
viii
response via ICAP. Depending on the response the proxy server receives,
it will then either forward or reject the request [8] .
Internet of Things IoT are smart devices equipped with computer software
and network connectivity that allows these devices to exchange and col-
lect data.
Man In The Middle MITM refers to an attack where the attacker covertly
relays and possibly alters the communication between two parties with-
out their knowledge in the context of computer security and cryptogra-
phy.
Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System OSSEC is a free
host-based intrusion detection (HIDS) system that runs on Windows,
MacOS, Solaris, FreeBSD, Linux, and OpenBSD. OSSEC offers the fol-
lowing functionalities: 1) correlation and analysis engine, 2) log analysis,
3) file integrity checking, 4) Windows registry monitoring, 5) centralised
policy enforcement, 6) rootkit detection, and 7) real-time alerting and
active response.
Open-source intelligence OSINT is an intelligence derived legally and eth-
ically from publicly available information such as magazines, television,
radio, computer-based information, and newspapers. Nowadays, OSINT
involves collecting information about a subject from either free or paid
Internet sources.
Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet PPPoE is a network protocol al-
lows tunnelling network traffic to the ISP’s IP network by encapsulating
PPP frames inside Ethernet frames. PPP facilities authenticate users
with a username and password through the use of PAP or CHAP proto-
col.
Remote Access Tool RAT can be used by system administrators to legiti-
mately control or access a computer remotely. Malicious users can also
use it to control the system without users’ knowledge, and when it is used
ix
with malicious intents, it is known as Remote Access Trojan. A RAT can
typically perform the following operations remotely: 1) screen and cam-
era capture, 2) file access, 3) registry management, 4) code execution, 5)
password sniffing, and 6) key logging.
Security Information and Event Management Server SIEM is a soft-
ware system that collects event data generated by network infrastruc-
ture, security devices, applications, and systems to correlate and analyse
the events with contextual data about assets, users, vulnerabilities, and
threats [9].
Server Name Indication SNI is a TLS extension that enables clients to
indicate which hostname it is trying to connect to at the beginning of
the SSL handshaking process.
Social Engineering Social-Engineer.org defines social engineering as that
”any act that influences a person to take an action that may or may
not be in their best interest” [10]. In the context of cyber security, it
usually refers to getting the target to execute malware or obtaining sen-
sitive information.
Spear Phishing is a type of scam email that only targets a small group of
selected people and trick users to either click on a link to a malicious web-
site or download an attachment that contains a malware but disguised
itself as a benign file.
SQL Injection SQL Injection describes a web-based attack in which attack-
ers insert an SQL query into the input data to the web application.
Through this kind of attack, attackers can read, write, modify, and exe-
cute administrative operations on the database.
Tor Anonymity Network TOR is a free software that connects a group
of volunteer-operated servers together and allows its users to connect
through a series of virtual tunnels rather than making a direct connection
to destinations. By doing so, users can reach otherwise blocked content
x
or destinations and circumvent the Internet censorship. TOR is used by
normal people on the Internet to improve the privacy and security of
their Internet browsing, but also used by criminals to hide their traces.
Watering Hole Attack A Watering Hole Attack starts by infecting web-
sites that are trusted by the target and frequently visited with malware.
The delivery of the malware is accomplished when the target visits the
infected websites.
Web Cache Communication Protocol WCCP is a proprietary protocol
developed by Cisco that allows some routers and switches to transpar-
ently redirect various traffic such as HTTP, TCP, UDP. WCCPv1 only
supports the redirection of HTTP traffic, and WCCPv2 supports for
other traffic.
Zero-day Exploits are undisclosed software vulnerabilities that hackers can
exploit to adversely affect software programmes, data or networks. The
term zero-day is used because it is unknown to the vendor, leaving the






A Web proxy is a dedicated appliance or computer software system acting as
an intermediary between an end-user device and the Web. In the early 1990s,
when most Internet connections were still on dial-up connections, Web proxy
was mainly used for sharing one Internet connection with multiple machines
on the same network. However, with the advent of broadband connections
and the use of Network Address Translation (NAT) on broadband routers,
this requirement was superseded. In late 1990s and early 2000s, due to the
exponential growth of the Web, and the speed of Internet connection being
unable to keep up with demands, the focus of the Web proxy was shifted
to improve Internet performance and save bandwidth. Much research was
conducted on the use of a Web proxy cache to improve performance in the
following three ways: 1) Increasing the Web proxy cache hit ratio to reduce the
user-perceived latency of accessing the Web; 2) Reducing the network load as
the content could be served locally from the Web proxy cache; 3) Reducing the
Web server load as the content was served by the Web proxy cache that would
otherwise be served by the Web server [11, 12]. In recent years, there have
been ongoing research interests in improving the performance of the Web, such
as Google’s Flywheel project [13], but it is more specifically for mobile devices
due to the high costs of mobile data, and throttling of Internet connections for
mobile devices. However, although data usage on average was reduced by 58%,
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the Page Load Time (PLT) increased by 6%. In [2], Vesuna et al. concluded
that caching does not improve PLT significantly for mobile devices because of
the slow CPU speeds and difficulty in caching items on the critical path.
Today, due to increasing Internet-borne threats, the growing use of cloud-
based applications, Internet policy compliance requirements, and the trend
toward Bring Your Own Device policy; there is an enormous paradigm shift
from a performance-oriented Web proxy solution to a Secure Web Gateway
solution [14, 15]. In [14], it forecasts that the market for the Secure Web
Gateway will grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 20.5%
from US$2.20 billion in 2015 to US$5.60 billion by 2020.
1.1.1 The current Web Ecosystem
The current Web Ecosystem has changed dramatically from a simple, static,
text-based Web to the current dynamic, multimedia Web with over 25% of
the world’s population connected to it [16]. Unfortunately, the growth and
dynamic of the Web has been accompanied by the evolution of web-based
crime. This has not only resulted in the development of new types of crime, but
also new techniques of committing old crimes. In the ENISA threat landscape
report, the top 15 threats present on the Web are [17]:
1. Malicious Code: Worms/Trojans
2. Web-based Attacks
3. Web Application Attacks/Injection Attacks
4. Botnets












These threats are increasingly targeted at the users - the weakest link and
make it difficult to detect and stop. On top of this, there is also much content
on the Web that may be considered objectionable because of policy compliance
or regulatory requirements.
1.1.2 Terminology
Many terms are used to describe the functions of the Secure Web Gateway or
the market segment for particular products. Some terms are interchangeable
with others. In additional to Secure Web Gateway, the following terms are
often used: content-filtering software, web filtering software, content-control
software, content-censoring software, content-blocking software, accountability
software, and parental control software. “Content-censoring software” is a
term often used by those critical of such software. Parental-control software is
specifically designed for parents to monitor and control Internet access by their
children. Accountability software is mainly used for Internet usage reporting
rather than filtering or blocking, although some can be configured to do so.
Other terms used in this thesis are described in the Glossary.
1.1.3 Secure Web Gateway vs. Web Proxy vs. Next-
Generation Firewall
Based on author’s empirical evidence as an IT infrastructure engineer with
more than ten years of industry experiences, a Secure Web Gateway is a so-
lution built upon Web Proxy with an emphasis on providing security func-
3
tions. Web Proxy, on the other hand, is predominantly used to provide content
caching functionality and improve user-perceived Internet performance. The
Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), as the name suggests, is the successor to
the traditional network firewall. In addition to standard firewall capability,
the NGFW proactive in blocking new threats, such as Botnet and targeted
attacks; providing wire-speed scanning that performs deep traffic analysis to
identify applications and enforce network security policies at the application
layer [18]. A Secure Web Gateway is more user-centric focusing on enforcing
outbound user access control and inbound malware prevention through inte-
grated URL filtering and threat detection, whereas an NGFW provides more
network-based monitoring. NGFW does not terminate and intercept traffic
and it is a stream-based technology, monitoring traffic as it passes by. It is
more effective in detecting and stopping threats utilising non-web-based pro-
tocols, but is generally lack of ability to perform SSL scanning and in-depth
URL analysis and categorisation. However, in [19], Musich suggests that in
the long term, the line between a Secure Web Gateway and an NGFW will be-
come blurred as vendors continue to integrate and create overarching security
platforms.
1.1.4 Top Market Drivers for Secure Web Gateway
The market drivers continue to be strong for Secure Web Gateways. In [20],
Joshua Mittler forecasts the following top drivers in the Secure Web Gateway
market, which will have a medium to high market impact until 2020.
Productivity Management
A Secure Web Gateway provides fine-grained access control over some or all
functions of Web applications based on users’ roles. It can also provide control
over the use of social media and web browsing not related to work efforts
during work hours, thus increasing productivity.
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Regulatory compliance requirements
Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) expects libraries, schools and other
public institutions that accept certain federal funding to provide filtered Inter-
net use to protect minors. A Secure Web Gateway can achieve compliance by
blocking objectionable materials through the use of URL filtering, management
of web categories by content type, restraint of keyword searches, and limits on
application and file sharing. A Secure Web Gateway can also protect end-users
against web-based attacks such as SQL Injection or Cross-site Scripting. Com-
panies that wish to pursue Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
(PCI-DSS) compliant can benefit from this protection.
Complex malware delivery through web browsing
Web browsers are popular vehicles through which hackers can deliver malware
to users. A Secure Web Gateway offers a layer of security between users and the
Internet and reduces the chance of users encountering malware by restricting
access to social media and networking sites, wikis, blogs, online file-sharing
applications and other high-risk websites/applications.
Mobile and cloud application access controls
It has become commonplace for organisations to allow their users to bring
their own technology or devices to the workplace and use them to connect
to corporate networks and access corporate data. This improves users’ pro-
ductivity but presents yet another mean by which malware can be delivered
especially through the wireless and mobile phone networks. The other category
in this driver is the increasing deployment of cloud-based service. This is the
primary driver in the growing adoption of cloud-based Secure Web Gateway
deployments [15].
Web/Internet usage reporting
A Secure Web Gateway provides insight into both real-time and historical
Web traffic usage. This is an important factor in meeting compliance and
regulatory requirements, establishing network activity baselines, offering data
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loss prevention capability and enforcing acceptable corporate usage guidelines.
These metrics, collected over time, become important data for detecting and
blocking complex malware such as Advanced Persistent Threat [21].
1.2 Motivation
Web proxy has been around since the beginning of the Web and evolved to
meet the needs of a fast-changing Web ecosystem. Traditionally, Web proxy
was used to fulfil these needs by: 1) Enabling several machines to share a single
Internet connection; 2) Improving Web performance and save bandwidth by
caching repeatedly-accessed content locally; 3) Providing basic URL filtering.
However, this is no longer sufficient to meet the requirements of the present
Web ecosystem. Firstly, with the development of Network Address Translation
in the late 1990s, the need for proxy servers to share an Internet connection
was superseded. Secondly, caching does not significantly improve performance
for mobile clients, and the mobile traffic volume has already exceeded that of
desktops [2, 3]. Thirdly, a Web content filter based on URL databases cannot
keep up with the growth in Internet traffic [4]. In addition, it has become
difficult to detect and stop threats such as Botnets and Advanced Persistent
Threats [5] because of: 1) The polymorphic characteristics of the threats; 2)
The increasing use of encryption on the Web; 3) Increased threats targeting
end-users - the weakest link; 4) The growing need to use a variety of end-
user devices in multiple locations such as the BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE
(BYOD) requirements. Hence, there is an imminent need to move from the
previous Web proxy solution to a Secure Web Gateway solution. Currently,
there are many expensive solutions on the market [22, 23, 24]. However, there
is a scarcity of literature and research on the key factors required to build an
effective solution to mitigate the risks mentioned above, particularly in the




The objective of this research was to categorise the key factors required to
build an effective Secure Web Gateway to protect a network of any size and
provide a reference architecture for implementing a Secure Web Gateway that
can be either on-site or in the cloud. The ultimate goal is to improve the
security of the Web and help organisations to take back the control of the
Internet.
1.3.2 Scope
The scope of the research is limited to categorising the following key factors
with a specific emphasis on protecting outbound traffic from end user devices.
• Key factors required to effectively filter traffic by controlling the end-
points, network services and rendezvous services involved in providing
access to Internet content and the key factors required to evaluate the
effectiveness of different methods based on the following criteria: scope,
granularity, efficacy, and security.
• Key factors required to implement Data Loss Prevention (DLP) and use
the following seven major analysis techniques to detect data leakage:
1) Database Fingerprinting; 2) Partial Document Matching; 3) Rule-
Base/Regular Expression; 4) Exact File Matching; 5) Statistical Analy-
sis; 6) Categories; 7) Conceptual/Lexicon.
• Key factors required to detect and block Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) by implementing controls to break the lifecycle of an APT: 1)
Reconnaissance and weaponization phase; 2) Delivery phase; 3)Initial
intrusion phase; 4) Command and control phase; 5) Lateral movement
phase, and 6) Data exfiltration phase.
• Key factors required to inspect SSL encrypted traffic by using Man In
The Middle (MITM), an Adaptive Security Model, and Server Name
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Indication (SNI) filtering. It also discusses two approaches, BlindBox
HTTPs and Privacy Preserving Inspection, for inspecting HTTPs traffic
without compromising the security and privacy of the communication.
• Key factors required in implementing privacy-preserving monitoring. Pri-
vacy is an important factor in the successful implementation of a Secure
Web Gateway in the workplace. It is a dilemma as employers need to
monitor employees’ Internet usage to protect business interests, while
employees demand the right to privacy in the workplace. Also, covert
and excessive monitoring has a negative impact on productivity. This
research reviews literature in the relevant areas and provides guidelines
for balancing the interests of both sides.
1.3.3 Key Contributions
This research not only provides a categorisation of key factors in building a
Secure Web Gateway, but also a practical implementation model. In addition,
it provides a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of an existing or new
Secure Web Gateway deployment. It also discusses the issues and challenges
that may be encountered in deploying a Secure Web Gateway.
1.4 Outline
This research began with the goal of identifying key factors in building a
Secure Web Gateway and recognised that the investment in Cyber Security
is long overdue despite the continued rise of cyber-crime [25, 26]. This is
partly due to a lack of knowledge, but also to the high cost of an enterprise
solution. A Secure Web Gateway is the first defence for an organisation as
it protects the outbound traffic generated by humans which are often the
weakest link in Cyber Security. Chapter 2 discusses current research on the
factors related to building a Secure Web Gateway. These include content
filtering, data loss prevention, advanced persistent threat, SSL filtering and
privacy factor. Chapter 3 discusses the process that was undertaken to solve
the aforementioned problems. This includes a reference architecture based
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on layered defence and the key factors identified in building a Secure Web
Gateway. Chapter 4 discusses the results of URL Filter Testing, False-Positive
Testing, Exploits Testing and DLP Testing that were used to validate the
effectiveness of the proposed design and architecture. Chapter 5 provides a
summary of the gaps and challenges identified after implementing and testing
the Secure Web Gateway using a residential vDSL connection. Chapter 6
summarises key outcomes and values delivered by this research and suggests




This chapter discusses the existing literature on the following factors relating
to building a Secure Web Gateway:
1. Content filtering: This is the ability to classify the different resources on
the Web accurately;
2. Data loss prevention: This is the ability to prevent the leakage of critical
business data;
3. APT detection and prevention: This is the ability to detect and defend
against advanced persistent threats;
4. SSL filtering: This is the ability to inspect SSL encrypted data without
breaking the trust and integrity of the Internet; and
5. Privacy preservation: This is a non-technical factor but a key to avoid
unnecessary risk of legal liability and regulatory compliance when imple-
menting a Secure Web Gateway in the workplace.
2.1 Content Filtering Factors
Generally speaking, content filtering is achieved by controlling the components
involved in providing access to Internet content, services or endpoints. In [27],
Barnes et al. consider the following elements are commonly involved in content
filtering:
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1. Server and Client Endpoints: These are applications running on com-
puters systems participating in the communication. For example, a web
browser running on a computer is an endpoint.
2. Network Services: These are services enabling communication between
endpoints. For example, the network routing protocol is required to
exchange packets between the endpoints
3. Rendezvous Services: Server or client endpoints use rendezvous services
to identify other endpoints on a network. For instance, a domain name
system is used to resolve a ”human-friendly” name to an IP address, and
an SIP proxy is used to identify an IP phone.
2.1.1 Evaluation Factors
To evaluate the technical implications of different filtering methods, they are
compared based on the following four criteria: scope, granularity, efficacy, and
security. Scope refers to the extent of the impact as a result of blocking. A
system is perceived as less objectionable by users if the extent of the impact
is as narrow as possible while still being effective. Granularity refers to the
specificity of the filtering. A system is perceived as less objectionable if it is
highly granular and does not cause any collateral damage. Efficacy refers the
effectiveness in preventing users from circumventing the filtering imposed by
the policy setting entity. Security refers to the ability to preserve the integrity
and trust of Internet protocols while still being able to provide an effective
filtering capability.
2.1.2 Network-Based Filtering
Network-Based Filtering inspects traffic as it travels through the network.
Based on the characteristics or the content of a communication, the system
decides whether it should be blocked or allowed to pass through. For example,
Web filtering devices can compare the requested URL to a blacklist or whitelist
database to decide whether to allow the request to go through or not. Cloud
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Security Alliance suggests the following features should exist in Web (URL) fil-
tering. [5]: 1) Known blacklist database maintained by industry or vendor; 2)
user-configurable addition to the blacklist database; 3) Categorisation of web-
sites; 4) Automatic background updates that do not require user intervention;
5) Comprehensive and accurate categorisation; 6) User-defined bypass URLs
(whitelist); 7) Domain names are used for rating in addition to URL and IP
addresses; 8) Provide multi-language support for international companies; 9)
Provide the ability to carry out dynamic categorisation that does not rely on
pre-determined user classification.
A key factor in successful Network-Based filtering is an effective traffic clas-
sification. Traffic classification provides the ability to automatically identify
an application from a given stream of packets collected using either direct or
passive observation of traffic coming into the network. In [28], Biersack, Cal-
legari, and Matijasevic attempted to classify different techniques based on the
following characteristics:
• Granularity: A coarse-grained algorithm can only distinguish the dif-
ference between large families of protocols such as Streaming vs. HTTP.
In contrast, a fine-grained classifier is possible to identify a specific pro-
tocol such as eDonkey vs. BitTorrent file-sharing, or even a specific
application such as SopCast vs. PPlive live streaming.
• Timeliness: This is an attempt to characterise the speed of classifica-
tion using three types: first packet, after a few packets, and after flow
termination. The post-mortem classification that analyses traffic after
flow termination is usually for monitoring tasks, such as charging.
• Computational Cost: This field indicates the CPU power required to
make the classification decision and inspect the traffic. Packet memory
access requires the most processing power, followed by regular expression
matching.
Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of each traffic classification approach.
A Port-Based approach identifies applications by extracting the port
number from the transport header and then searching for it in a table con-
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taining port-application associations. A Deep Packet Inspection approach
matches the payload of the packet against a list of known patterns. Stochastic
Packet Inspection tries to identify an application by examining the statisti-
cal properties of the payload for common string patterns, using the values of
the first payload bytes as features for machine learning algorithms, assessing
the randomness of the first payload bytes, and finally calculating the entropy
of the first payload bytes. The L7-filter is an example of implementation of
DPI in Linux kernel and the website of [29] contains classifiers that identify a
comprehensive list of applications such as HTTP, Citrix, Kazaa, Jabber, Bit-
Torrent, Gnucleus, eDonkey2000, and FTP, regardless of which port number
being used. Statistical approaches try to classify traffic by applying sta-
tistical tools to the flow-based or host-based measurements. Behavioural
approaches use similar data mining methods to the statistical approach, but
analyse patterns generated by a host or endpoint (IP:port) that are further
up in the network stack. The fundamental idea is that different applications
are likely to exhibit different behaviours in terms of transport layer protocols
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used, numbers of hosts contacted, numbers of distinct ports contacted, and
connection graphs and patterns between endpoints.
2.1.3 Rendezvous-Based Filtering
Rendezvous-Based Filtering is a technique that controls common rendezvous
services such as certificate authorities (CA), search engines, Domain Name
Systems, Internet Route registries, and WHOIS databases which are often re-
quired for the proper operation of an Internet application. DNS Filtering is
one of the easiest ways to conduct content filtering. It works by stopping users
from being able to resolve the name of a website or domain, thus blocking
access to these Web resources. Many paid or free services such as OpenDNS
allowing users to block different categories of websites (e.g. Adult materials),
instead of defining individual names. DNS blocking was proposed to be man-
dated by the Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA)
in late 2011 in the US to address large-scale online copyright and trademark
infringement because of the simplicity of implementation [30]. Another exam-
ple is to advertise bogus routes through BGP so that users are unable to reach
the real destination. A famous incident occurred in 2008, in which Pakistan
Telecom advertised a bogus route, claiming to be the legitimate destination
for the YouTube IP address as an attempt to block access to YouTube [31].
2.1.4 Endpoint-Based Filtering
Endpoint-Based Filtering is where the filtering decision is made by either a
client or a server endpoint. An example is the ”Safe Browsing” service offered
by Google, which lets client applications such as the browser check URLs
against Google’s constantly updated list of unsafe web resources. Other prod-
ucts such as Norton Safe Web and McAfee SiteAdvisor provide a similar ser-
vice. On the other side of end-to-end communication - Server Endpoints -
access to contents can be controlled by using a whitelisting method such as IP
ACLs or password authentication.
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2.2 Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Factors
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is more than just a myriad of solutions and
services available in the market; it is also a business strategy to avoid users
from transferring sensitive or critical information outside a corporate network
either inadvertently or deliberately. DLP is the most popular term. However,
the following terms are also used interchangeably:
• Data Leak Prevention
• Information Loss/Leak Prevention
• Extrusion Prevention
• Content Monitoring and Filtering/Protection
Vontu, now acquired by Symantec, in figure 2.1 shows the risk of Data Loss
in an average organisation [32]. The main driver for the adoption of a DLP
strategy is increasing privacy requirements and the risk of insider threat, which
is one of the top cyber-threats according to the ENISA Threat Landscape 2014
report [17]. The DLP market is expected to grow from US$0.96 billion in 2015
to US$2.64 billion by 2020, at a CAGR of 22.3% from 2015 to 2020 [33].
Figure 2.1: Data Loss Prevention Drivers
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2.2.1 The DLP Lifecycle
In [34], Mogull defines three major areas which to protect to protect content
throughout its lifecycle:
• Data At Rest The aim is to protect data stored either on-site or in
the cloud by scanning and identifying critical and sensitive information.
For example, DLP software can scan network shares, identify documents
with credit card numbers, and then perform any appropriate actions to
protect them.
• Data In Motion This is to protect data in transit by sniffing the
network traffic passively or in-line via a proxy to identify the content
sent across communication channels such as HTTP, FTP, IM, P2P and
SMTP.
• Data In Use To protect data in this state typically requires monitoring
the data at the endpoint where the user interacts with the data. For
example, DLP software can monitor any data leaving via removable de-
vices, such as CDs, and USBs. This usually requires an agent deployed
at the end-user workstation.
According to Gartner, DLP technology is divided into two categories [35]:
• Enterprise DLP This usually requires holistic functionalities such as
a centralised management console, support for advanced policy defini-
tion, and event management workflow to solve the business and technical
problems of preventing data loss and leakage.
• Integrated DLP This only has limited DLP features integrated with
other security products such as secure web gateways, secure email gate-
ways, email encryption products, enterprise content management plat-




A comprehensive discussion of DLP techniques is beyond the scope of this
study, which focuses only on the integrated DLP features that provide protec-
tion to Data In Motion.
An effective DLP solution must be able to perform both deep content in-
spection and contextual analysis of data using a variety of techniques. Con-
tent, as the name suggests, is the actual information, whereas context includes
everything else such as source, destination, size, recipients, sender, header in-
formation, metadata, time, and format. As suggested in [34], the following
seven major analysis techniques can be used in content analysis:
1. Rule-Based/Regular Expressions: This is the most common analy-
sis technique for quickly identifying structured information like health-
care codes/records, credit card numbers, and social security numbers.
2. Database Fingerprinting: This technique looks for exact matches by
taking either a database dump or live data (via ODBC connection) from
a database.
3. Exact File Matching: This works by taking a hash of a file and mon-
itoring any files that match that exact fingerprint. This technique does
not analyse the contents.
4. Partial Document Matching: This technique usually takes a cyclical
hash of a complete or partial content and looks for a match. Cyclical
hashing works by taking a hash of a portion of the content, offset by a
predetermined number of characters, and then taking another hash of
the content. The process is repeated until the entire content is parsed.
This creates a series of overlapping hash values.
5. Statistical Analysis: This uses a machine learning algorithm such as
Bayesian analysis or other statistical analysis of content to find policy
violations in content that resembles the protected content.
6. Conceptual/Lexicon: This uses a combination of sources like dictio-
naries, rules and other analyses to protect ambiguous content that resem-
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bles an ”idea”. For example, it could use key phrases, word counts, and
positions to find traffic that resembles insider trading, sexual harassment,
or job hunting.
7. Categories: This technique uses pre-compiled categories that look for
common types of sensitive data such as PCI DSS protection, and HIPAA.
In Table 2.2, it shows an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the
seven techniques mentioned above.
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Figure 2.2: Data Loss Prevention Process
age of the classified data; 4) Act: if the data is identified, enforce policy-based
actions; 5) Report: report the status of the identified data based on the defined
rule set. Fig 2.2 provides an overview of the DLP process.
2.3 Advanced Persistent Threat Factors
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) has been a catchphrase for many years in
the security industry, and almost all security vendors claim their products can
give some level of protection against APT. This is mostly due to the high profile
nature of several large-scale security breaches in the past, such as Operation
Aurora [36], intrusions to SK Communications [37], RSA Breach [38], Opera-
tion Ke3chang [39] and Operation SnowMan [40] etc. To understand how to
protect an organisation from APT, one needs to understand the characteristics
and the attack model of the APT. In [41], Bejtlich provides a good comparison
between a traditional attack and an APT attack and also an anatomy of the
attack model. In Table 2.3 shows the differences between a traditional threat
and an APT. As shown in the table, APT attack follows a similar model to
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a traditional attack, but the techniques used in each stage are different. An
APT attack usually consists of the following phases, which are analogous to
the concept of the intrusion kill chain introduced in [42] and the attack lifecycle
introduced in [43].
Table 2.3: Comparison of traditional and APT attacks [41]
Traditional Attacks APT Attacks
Attacker Mostly single person Highly organised, sophisticated,
determined and well-resourced
group









Approach Single-run, ”smash and grab”,
short period
Repeated attempts, stays low
and slow, adapts to resist
defences, long term
2.3.1 APT Lifecycle
1. Reconnaissance and Weaponization Phase: Attackers attempt to
collect information about the target. The more information attackers col-
lect, the more likely they are to succeed in the later attack phases. Open-
source intelligence (OSINT) or Social Engineering are popular techniques
for collecting the information. Attackers can use this information to pre-
pare the necessary tools and construct an attack plan.
2. Delivery Attackers deliver their malware to targets either directly through
different Social Engineering techniques such as Spear Phishing or indi-
rectly via a compromised third-party website trusted by the targets, such
as the Watering Hole Attack technique.
3. Initial Intrusion Phase: After successfully executing the malware on
the target, attackers then try to establish a foothold in the environment
by controlling computers within the target organisation remotely. This
is done by exploiting vulnerabilities in popular software such as Adobe
Flash, Internet Explorer, Microsoft Office and Adobe PDF. Some APTs
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leverage zero-day exploits while others may employ old exploits that
target unpatched applications.
4. Command and Control Phase: Command and Control (C2) is a tech-
nique for taking control of a group of compromised computers. C2 en-
ables further exploitation of the network. This is usually done stealthily,
leveraging different legitimate services and publicly available tools such
as Tor Anonymity Network, Remote Access Tool (RAT) and social net-
working websites.
5. Lateral Movement Phase: This is an iterative cycle involving the
following activities: 1) perform internal reconnaissance to obtain more
information about the target environment; 2) harvest credentials and
gain elevated privileges by compromising more computer systems; 3)
identify and collect valuable data. This phase often lasts a long time as
it is designed to run low and slow to make it difficult to detect.
6. Data Exfiltration Phase: Stealing data such as internal memoranda or
policy papers, business contracts or negotiations, and intellectual prop-
erty is the primary goal of APTs. The data is often compressed and
encrypted before transferring it to an external location under the at-
tacker’s control via TLS or Tor Anonymity Network.
2.3.2 Countermeasures
Due to the stealthiness and complexity of APTs, defence usually requires a
combination of different security countermeasures. This study discusses the
security countermeasures that can be implemented in a Secure Web Gateway
by inspecting the outbound traffic to uncover the APT. These countermeasures
are useful in detecting and blocking APTs in the following phases of the APT
attack lifecycle.
Delivery Phase: In addition to the traditional defence mechanisms such as
URL filtering, malware protection, and Adware/Spyware protection, a Secure
Web Gateway can incorporate the Sandboxing technique for analysing the
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behaviour of an executable, which allows defenders to detect Zero-day Exploits
[44].
Command and Control Phase: As an APT depends on remote access
and control of infected computers inside a network, APTs can be contained
and disrupted by analysing the network activities associated with the remote
control. In [45], Binde, McRee, and O’Connor proposes the following four
approaches to detect APTs through the analysis of outbound network traffic.
• Rule Sets: This is a signature-based detection method, matching net-
work traffic to known malicious patterns of system and network be-
haviours. Examples of these include identifying phishing campaigns and;
recognising and blocking malicious traffic such as that associated with
the Poison-Ivy Remote Access Toolkit.
• Statistical and Correlation Methods: This approach involves study-
ing normal behaviour and searching for anomalous activities. For ex-
ample, attackers can use a method called fast-flux to make tracking of
data exfiltration difficult. The defender can analyse the output of gener-
ated fast-flux network traffic to detect statistical variation from expected
norms. This requires analysing massive amounts of data, potentially
through machine learning. Some research has been done using big data
analytics for APT detection [46, 30]
• Manual Approaches: This uses digital forensic techniques to manually
detect anomalous behaviour via logging and monitoring. For example, a
SQL statement that is abnormally larger shows a sign for further inves-
tigation. Other examples include that unusual outbound traffic initiated
from the target organisation, DNS logs, and abnormal traffic as compared
to known good NetFlow baselines.
• Detecting and Blocking Data Exfiltration: The following lists the
methods to detect and block data exfiltration by analysing the character-
istics of outgoing traffic: 1) detect and block RAR files; 2) undertake an
Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System (OSSEC) Active
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Response; 3) limit outbound access; 4) monitor for precursor attacks.
RAR compression has been used as a way to obscure data. RAR files
should be blocked if an enterprise determines that it should never egress
from a given network. OSSEC Active Response runs preventative com-
mands or responses on the client or server side when some events are
triggered. It is a good protection against port scans, brute forces and
other information-gathering attacks. It is also useful to allow only a
Secure Web Gateway to initiate outbound traffic to the Internet and
block all other egress traffic. Even if the device is exploited and mal-
ware is installed, it may not be able to exfiltrate the data to an external
host. Monitoring for precursor attacks can prevent more users being ex-
ploited by a known attack. This can be automated by integrating with
blacklists or scripts developed by [47] to remove JavaScript inside the
Portable Document Formats (PDF) files as they are transferred through
the Secure Web Gateway.
2.4 SSL filtering Factors
2.4.1 Background to the SSL protocol
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the successor of the Security Socket
Layer (SSL) protocol [48]. These two terms are used interchangeably unless
reference is being made to a specific version of the protocol. SSL is the most
widely used term for the encryption protocol on the Internet. HTTPs is the
secure application protocol running on top of the SSL and is commonly used
to secure communications between browsers and the Web. A research that had
monitored 25,000 residential ADSL customers between 2012 and 2014 showed
that HTTPs flows are more than doubled in two years [49]. Google, FaceBook,
YouTube and other major content providers are changing to HTTPs. How-
ever, this also brings a new challenge to the Secure Web Gateway as now it
becomes difficult to filter out unwanted content within the encrypted traffic.
SSL has not only been used in benign communications to protect sensitive
and confidential information but has also been used in malicious traffic to get
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around traditional security controls.
Three main pillars underpin the operation of the SSL protocol - privacy,
integrity and authenticity. Privacy prohibits others from intercepting the traf-
fic; integrity ensures the data has not been altered in transit; and authenticity
aims at validating the communicating parties. SSL provides privacy through
the use of symmetric encryption, integrity via cryptographic message digests,
and authenticity by using the X.509 public key infrastructure. Figure 2.3 shows
a basic handshake to establish a SSL session. The process starts with a SSL
client sending a hello message to a SSL server. The message includes a sup-
ported protocol version, a list of supported cipher suites, and a client-generated
random number. Then, the SSL server responds it with a Server Hello mes-
sage. The message contains a server certificate, the server’s preferred cipher
suite, and a server-generated random number. The server certificate contains
the SSL server’s public key and hostname, digitally signed by a CA. In the
next step, the SSL client sends the ClientKeyExchange message that contains
a pre-master secret encrypted by using the SSL server’s public key. The SSL
client and server can acquire the same session key from the pre-master secret
and random numbers. In the last step, the SSL client and server exchange
ChangeCipherSpec message to inform each other that subsequent data will be
encrypted using the session key derived from the previous step.
During the SSL handshake process, the ssl client is responsible for validat-
ing the certificate presented by the ssl server by following the X.509 specifi-
cation [50]. In [51], Jarmoc and Unit provides a summary of the RFC5280
validation process:
• Verify the certificate’s digital signature.
• Determine the CA and all intermediate certificates by following the cer-
tificate chain.
• Check if the client browser trusts the root CA.
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Figure 2.3: A basic handshake to establish an SSL session
• Compare the subject in the certificate with the expectation in the higher
level protocol such as application layer to determine if they are the same.
• Use the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and check the certifi-
cate revocation list to determine whether the certificate has been revoked
[52].
2.4.2 SSL Interception Proxy
To intercept and inspect SSL-encrypted traffic, the SSL session needs to be
terminated at the proxy server, and the proxy server has the private key to
decrypt the traffic. Figure 2.4 shows that the SSL proxy substitutes the cer-
tificate with its own that is issued by a CA trusted by the SSL client. The SSL
proxy then generates another SSL session with the destination. This method is
called Man In The Middle (MITM). The SSL proxy can sign such certificates
using one of the following two methods: 1) The most frequently used method
is using a private CA to sign the certificate, and the private CA’s certificate is
imported into the client’s trusted root certificate store, or 2) Create a SubCA
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Figure 2.4: SSL session establishment with involving an SSL proxy
that acts as an intermediate signing authority authorised by a public trust root
CA.
2.4.3 Adaptive Security Model
In [53], Jawi, Ali, and Zulkipli proposed an adaptive security model. Figure
2.5 illustrates the components of the proposed solution. The proposed solution
consists of the following components:
• Monitoring component collects environment factors from client de-
vices and certificate information from SSL servers.
• Analysis component is responsible for analysing the information passed
through from the monitoring component
• Response component is in charge of making the decision on permitting
or rejecting the connection
An adaptive proxy operates in two modes based on the current security
threat level. When the threat level is low, the pass-through mode is used, and
it only exposes the server certificate and the URL information to the proxy
server. When the threat level is high, the MITM method as described above














Figure 2.5: Adaptive proxy components [53]
2.4.4 Server Name Indication (SNI)-based filtering
The SNI extension allows clients to indicate which hostname they are trying to
connect to at the start of the SSL handshaking process [54]. This extension is
created to allow multiple secure websites with different certificates to be served
from the same IP addresses. This technique inspects the ”server name” value
inside the SNI extension to determine whether the traffic should be allowed or
blocked. As shown in Fig. 2.6, the gateway can either allow the Client Hello
message to be sent to the destination server to complete the handshake or
reset the connection. However, SNI-based filtering can be easily circumvented
as suggested by Shbair et al. in [55].
2.4.5 BlindBox HTTPS
In [56], Sherry et al. presents a novel approach - BlindBox HTTPS - that
maintains the privacy of SSL encryption and at the same time provides the
ability to carry out deep packet inspection directly on the encrypted traffic.
The system is built upon a new searchable encryption scheme called DPIEnc
that supports inspecting the encrypted payload by using exact string match-
ing, regular expression or scripting. Other encryption schemes such as fully
homomorphic encryption or functional encryption can achieve the same re-
sult but are prohibitively slow for use in a production environment. BlindBox
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Figure 2.6: SNI Filtering Sequence Diagram [55]
claims that it can inspect packets at a rate of up to 186Mbps per core, which
is comparable to most standard IPS/IDS implementations. Fig. 2.7 shows the
system architecture of the BlindBox. BlindBox basically contains four parties:
1) Sender (S), 2) Receiver (R), 3) middlebox (MB), 4), and rule generator
(RG). At a high level, it functions as follows:
1. Initialisation: The RG role is normally fulfilled by organisations like
Emerging Threats [57], McAfee, or Symantec. RG generates a set of
rules signed with its private key before sharing them with MB. S and R
obtain RG’s public key by installing a BlindBox HTTPS configuration.
Beyond this, RG does nothing else.
2. Connection Setup: In this phase, S and R perform a normal SSL
handshake to agree on a key K0. Then S and R use K0 to derive three
other keys: 1) KSSL: a regular SSL key to encrypt the traffic, 2) K,
which is used in the detection protocol, and 3) Krand is used as a seed for
randomness so that both S and R will generate the same randomness.
The rules from RG are encrypted with key K and MB does not learn
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the value of K. The process is done in such way that R and S do not
learn what the rules are. The whole process is described as obfuscated
rule encryption. The only downside of this process is that it removes the
transparency of the MB as S and R need to communicate with the MB.
3. Sending Traffic: Before sending the traffic, the sender prepares the
traffic in the following ways: 1) encrypting the traffic using regular SSL;
2) splitting the traffic into substrings (tokenize) taken from various off-
sets, and 3) using the DPIEnc encryption scheme to encrypt the resulting
tokens.
4. Detection: When the BlindBox receives the encrypted tokens and the
encrypted traffic, it uses a function called BlindBox Detect to search for
matching between the encrypted rules and the encrypted tokens. Based
on the detection result and the policy defined, BlindBox can then decide
what actions to take against the traffic (drop, stop, or notify). At the end
of detection, MB forwards both encrypted traffic and encrypted tokens
to the receiver.
5. Receiving Traffic: There are two actions performed by the receiver.
First, the receiver performs the regular SSL decryption and authentica-
tion. Second, the receiver verifies the integrity of the token by making
sure it has been generated properly by the other endpoint and the other
endpoint is not trying to circumvent the checks at the MB by generating
only a subset of the tokens.
With this architecture, BlindBox supports two classes of privacy model: exact
match privacy and probable cause privacy. Under the exact match privacy
model, the MB only learns at which positions in a flow, matched keywords
occur. For the probable cause privacy model, the MB can only see a decrypted
packet, or flow if the flow contains a matched keyword. Both privacy models
are much stronger than the MITM approach discussed earlier in this review.
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Figure 2.7: BlindBox System Architecture [56]





















Figure 2.8: A PRI System used for prevention [58]
2.4.6 Privacy Preserving Inspection (PRI)
Privacy Preserving Inspection (PRI) is another attempt to solve the privacy
issue of inspecting encrypted network traffic. In [58], Schiff and Schmid pro-
posed a novel approach that leverages Intel Software Guard Extensions, a type
of hardware architecture that provides data privacy. The solution decouples
the different roles required for network traffic inspection such as users, rules,
configuration provider and administrators. With the support of the right hard-
ware, the implementation of PRI is simple and requires only a minor software
update to the client. At a higher level, here is how the inspection is carried
out in a PRI system as shown in Fig. 2.8:
1. If the solution is run the detection mode, the client will establish an
encrypted session with the server. If the solution is run in prevention
mode, the client will check with the Enclaved PRI code to determine
whether to allow the traffic to move through the PRI system.
2. The client sends the session key encrypted by the shared user key to the
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PRI server: [KS]KU .
3. PRI duplicates and decrypts the session traffic using the session key. The
decrypted traffic is then processed by the PRI.
4. PRI inspects the session data using the rules supplied by the policy issuer.
5. The packet is stored in the Secure PRI Storage when the data matches
a rule, Then, an alert is sent to a Security Information and Event Man-
agement Server for the purpose of analysis and reporting.
2.5 Privacy Factors
Employee monitoring is a common practice in the workplace, including Inter-
net usage monitoring using a Secure Web Gateway. However, incorrect imple-
mentation of employee monitoring or excessive monitoring can result in loss
of trust, high staff turnover, lower productivity and even personal grievance
action from employees. Thus, a key factor in the successful implementation
of Secure Web Gateways in the workplace is to be able to balance employers’
interests against the privacy concerns of employees.
2.5.1 Privacy Definition
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in 1890 described ”Privacy” as ”the right
to be let alone” [59]. Tipping J extended this definition to ”the right to have
people leave you alone if you do not want some aspect of your personal life
to become public property” in the Hosking v. Runting case [60]. Universally,
privacy is often seen as a fundamental human right. However, it has never
been an absolute right; in the employment context, employers’ interests often
trump employees’ rights to privacy.
2.5.2 Employees’ Rights to Privacy
A book published by the privacy commissioner of New Zealand states that it
is reasonable for employers to apply some form of control over how employer-
provided resources such as the Internet and email can be used. However, the
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act of monitoring must be done in a fair and reasonable manner [61]. Employ-
ment agreements determine employees’ rights to privacy and employees cannot
insist on their privacy rights upon entering an employment relationship if the
contract waived those privacy rights [62]. Some argue that monitoring em-
ployees’ Internet usage not constitute the definition of ”collect” in the Privacy
Act because the information is unsolicited and is already in the system when
the traffic moves through the network Roth. Excessive intrusion of privacy can
have adverse impact on a person’s dignity, emotional well-being and autonomy,
but employees often have no choice but to give up their rights due to inequal-
ity bargaining power between employers and employees; Oliver believes that
privacy rights should not be able to be contracted out to employers if these
rights are seen as fundamental human rights [64]. In some legal cases about
employees’ dismissal due to an inappropriate use of the Internet in the work-
place, the judge’s decision was based on whether employees had a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the policy had provided a clear boundary
[63]. In New Zealand, privacy principles one to four deal with the collection
of personal information, which has some level of restraint on Internet usage
monitoring.
2.5.3 Legal Framework
In UK, the following legislation can have implications for employee monitoring
[64]:
• The Human Rights Act 1998 is based on the Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). ECHR proscribes monitor-
ing in areas where employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, this expectation is often controlled by company policies.
• The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: This imple-
ments Directive 97/66/EC concerning the privacy of telecommunications.
Under this legislation, employers can only carry out interception if em-
ployers have obtained consent from either the sender or the recipient.
• The Data Protection Act 1998: This law regulates the processing
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of personal data by data controllers as set out in Directive 97/66/EC,
concerning the privacy of telecommunication. Under this legislation, it
is unlawful to perform the monitoring if the process is unwarranted or
employers have no legitimate interests as per Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule
2.
In [62], Britton lists the following legal frameworks in New Zealand that
could be applied to privacy rights in the workplace:
• Employment Relations Act 2000 deals with unequal bargaining power
between employers and employees, which is an issue in employee moni-
toring as discussed in the previous section. Employers must make sure
they carrying out monitoring in a fair and reasonable manner to reduce
the risk of employees’ personal grievance claims.
• Human rights Act 1993 proscribes discrimination against an individ-
ual on any of these prohibited grounds: ”sexual orientation, sex, family
status, marital status, religious belief, employment status, ethical belief,
political opinion, colour, age, race, disability, national origins or ethnic”,
using the information collected from a monitoring device.
• Privacy Act 1993 consists of twelve information privacy principles that
govern how an agent (employer) can collect, use, disclose, store and give
access to personal information.
• Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 limits employees’
rights to claim privacy in the workplace. Employers are compelled to
create a safe work environment and proactively manage hazards in the
workplace. Hence, for security purposes, employers may be able to justify
privacy-invasive monitoring techniques.
• Section 216B of Crimes Act 1961 disallows purposely intercepting
any private communication using a monitoring device except for circum-
stances in which any party in the communication reasonably expects that
some other people may intercept the communication. To avoid violat-
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ing this law, employers often create work policies to control employees’
expectations of privacy.
In the United States, the following federal law imposes various restrictions
on how employers monitor their employees’ electronic communications [65]:
• The Federal Wiretap Act FWA prohibits purposely using any elec-
tronic or mechanical device to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, excluding any communication in which the person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
• The Stored Communications Act SCA prohibits purposely access a
wire or electronic communication without authorisation while it is in the
electronic storage of an electronic communication system. This excludes
authorised to access and access by the providers of the electronic com-
munications service. For example, employers are excluded from the SCA
as they are probably the provider of internal Internet and email systems.
• The Pen Register Act PRA prohibits recording dialled telephone num-
bers or the telephone numbers of incoming calls. However, the PRA
excludes the providers of the electronic communication system, hence
employers may be excluded. However, a court case held that the PRA
does not apply to IP address as they are more like the material of a
telephone call rather than the telephone numbers [66].
• The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ECPA allows the
following three exceptions which are related to employee monitoring: 1)
Employees have consented the monitoring in either an express form where
employees sign a notice or an inferred form, where employees have only
been notified about the monitoring; 2) Employers are allowed to monitor
on the ground of ”ordinary course of business”, and 3) Providers of the
system are exempted from this.
• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act CFAA prohibits unauthorised
access, access exceeding current authorisation, access causing damages,
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and accessing causing loss to a ”protected computer”. CFAA is usually
seen as limiting the privacy rights in the workplace.
• The National Labor Relations Act Under NLRA, it is prohibited
for employers to take action against employees for conducting lawful
union business or union organising activities using the company-provided
resources; moreover, employers cannot even have a policy to discourage
such activities.
• Protections of Whistleblower Federal statutory schemes such as Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform, Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and Ex-
change Act of 1934 protect employees’ rights to report employers’ certain
unlawful conducts. For example, employers cannot take adverse actions
against their employees for reporting their employers’ misconducts.
• The Bankruptcy Act This prohibits employers from using the infor-
mation gathered from monitoring employees’ electronic activities to dis-
criminate against employees who have taken advantage of bankruptcy
protection.
In the United States, the most relevant legislation to privacy in the elec-
tronic communication is ECPA which proscribes the unconsented interception,
storage and disclosure of electronic communications, with the following excep-
tions [67]:
• Business Exception: Employers can intercept communications using
a qualified device for the ordinary course of business purposes.
• Consent: Employers can intercept a communication if they have ob-
tained consent from one of the parties involved in the communication.
• Service Provider: Employers who are the providers of electronic com-
munication services can retrieve information maintained on their sys-
tems. Employees’ rights to privacy must yield to employers’ property
rights.
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The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 that was signed into law by President
Obama in 2015 provides employers with authority to monitor a company’s
information systems, use defensive measures on a company’s information sys-
tem, and share both incoming and outgoing information with others for ”cy-
bersecurity purposes” Kerr. Also, employers can outsource these functions to a
third-party company. However, it is unclear what constitutes a ”cybersecurity
purpose”, and the new legislation arguably gives a broader scope than existing
provider exceptions.
2.5.4 Privacy Preserving Monitoring
To balance employers’ business interests with employees’ rights to privacy, and
to create a productive work environment and reduce the risk of legal liability,
companies should consult their legal department, human resources department,
employees, and union representatives, if applicable; these provide input to cre-
ate an acceptable computer-use policy [67]. Cox, Goette, and Young provides
the following guidelines for implementing an acceptable computer-use policy
in the workplace [67]:
1. Employers should include a written policy in employee manuals and lit-
erature.
2. Employers should ensure employees have the opportunity to read and
accept the policy in writing or electronically.
3. Employers should remind their employees about the existence and con-
tent of the policy regularly.
4. Employers should send out a notification to their employees about the
monitoring of Internet usage on a regular basis. One example is to config-
ure the computer to display a warning message the first time employees
log-on to the PC.
5. Employers should advise employees that password protection or HTTPs
encryption are not immune to inspection.
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6. Employers should advise their employees that violations of the policy
may result in disciplinary actions up to and including termination of
employment.
7. Employers should give examples of what counts as appropriate usage and
what does not, including excessive personal use, should personal use be
allowed by policy.
Table 2.4 lists the key components recommended by the US Government










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter discusses the steps that have been undertaken to identify and
categorise the key factors, develop a practical design and architecture for an
implementation and finally a testing framework to evaluate the effectiveness of
a deployment. This chapter concludes with the reasoning behind this method-
ology.
3.1 Approach
A Secure Web Gateway is essentially a Web Proxy with various incorporated
security countermeasures to protect end users from web-borne threats. Al-
though many commercial products in the market claim they can perform the
functions of a Secure Web Gateway, there has not been much academic re-
search in this area. Most existing research focuses either on the performance
of the web proxy [70, 11, 71, 13] or on individual security countermeasures [45].
Thus, this thesis approaches this problem by first identifying and categorising
the key factors in building a Secure Web Gateway, followed by selecting suit-
able hardware and software for running a Secure Web Gateway, developing a
design and architecture for a home or small office implementation, developing
a testing framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation, and
finally testing the implementation using a residential vDSL connection. The
following outlines the stages undertaken in this research:
1. Research - Chapter 2
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• Identifying market drivers in transforming the traditional web proxy
to a Secure Web Gateway
• Analysing related works and existing security countermeasures
2. Planning - Chapter 3
• Selecting the key factors in building a Secure Web Gateway
• Creating a reference design and architecture to deliver the required
capability
• Selecting suitable hardware for running a Secure Web Gateway
3. Development - Appendix A, B
• Installing and configuring the hardware and software according to
the defined configuration
• Defining a test plan
• Creating a testing framework to automate the tests defined in the
test plan
4. Testing and evaluation - Chapter 4, 5
• Testing the Secure Web Gateway implementation and evaluating its
effectiveness according to the findings in the research stage
• Comparing the test results with another commercial implementa-
tion
• Identifying the gaps and challenges in building a Secure Web Gate-
way
3.2 Reasoning
People need to understand the reasoning behind investing in a Secure Web
Gateway, and therefore it is important to understand the market drivers for
it. To transform a traditional web proxy to a Secure Web Gateway, one needs
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to understand the different security countermeasures required to thwart web-
borne threats. After analysing the related work in the research stage, a plan-
ning stage is required to categorise the key factors in building a Secure Web
Gateway. The categorisation helps to identify the optimal network and soft-
ware configuration and the required hardware that can be used to validate the
key factors. Gaps and challenges identified in the planning stage are used as
an input for developing the design and architecture in the subsequent stage.
In the development stage, it is necessary to demonstrate the ability to setting
up a Secure Web Gateway, and devise a test plan and testing framework for
testing the effectiveness of the implementation. It is hard to measure the ef-
fectiveness of a Secure Web Gateway without something to compare it against
and this is why this research chose to compare the test results with another
commercial implementation.
3.3 Key Factors
The review of the related literature led to the development of the Content-
filtering, DLP, APT, SSL-filtering, and Privacy factors for building the Secure
Web Gateway. Fig 3.1 provides a view on these factors and their associated
sub-factors. A Secure Web Gateway needs to be able to classify Internet
resources based on their content through network-based, rendezvous-based or
endpoint-based filtering. SSL-filtering is a vital capability as more and more In-
ternet resources are delivered through SSL encryption. MITM is currently the
most widely used method, but presents a security and privacy risk. Blindbox
and PRI offer a novel approach to maintaining the balance between privacy and
security, but they are not yet available for a production implementation. An
Adaptive Security model using SNI-based filtering is the most practical method
that allows administrators to disable SSL inspection on privacy-sensitive In-
ternet resources selectively. APT is becoming more prevalent and is used by
organised criminals targeting enterprises. A Secure Web Gateway can break
the APT lifecycle by controlling the communication between end-user devices
and C2 servers, and the delivery of malware through compromised Internet
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resources. DLP is often integrated with a Secure Web Gateway and offered
as an optional feature. A Secure Web Gateway can inspect data as it tra-
verses the network and uses one of the DLP techniques to match and block
exfiltration of classified information. Privacy is a non-technical factor that one
should consider when implementing a Secure Web Gateway. A company should
work with its legal counsel to develop and publish a computer use policy be-

















































Figure 3.1: Secure Web Gateway Key Factors
3.4 Reference Design and Architecture
This section discusses the design and architecture of a Secure Web Gateway
implementation. Based on the factors discussed in the previous section, the
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design and architecture need to satisfy the following requirements:
R1 Effectiveness The Secure Web Gateway needs to be able to detect and
block web-based attacks effectively with low false positive and false neg-
ative rates.
R2 Granularity The Secure Web Gateway needs to be able to work seam-
lessly with all end user devices such as desktop, laptop, tablet or mobile
devices. It should allow access to any benign Internet services such as
video streaming, websites, and web-based API while maintaining an ef-
fective control over access to malicious resources.
R3 Security The Secure Web Gateway needs to be able to provide Internet
protection without breaking security properties of Internet protocols such
as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and IPsec, which are designed to
ensure communication between endpoints is secured.
R4 Affordability This research aims to find a solution that is practical and
affordable for small business or ordinary home use. There are already
enterprise solutions on the market such as ZScaler, Blue Coat, Cisco,
Forcepoint (formerly Websense), and Intel McAfee, which target large
enterprise customers.
3.4.1 Network Architecture
Three possible network architectures were considered: 1) Explicit Web Proxy
architecture that requires clients to configure their browsers or applications
to use the proxy server; 2) Transparent Web Proxy architecture in which the
proxy server is the intermediary that sits in between the client and server on the
Internet; 3) Leverage the Web Cache Communication Protocol (WCCP) if the
routers or switches in the environment support this protocol. The first option
is prone to circumvention and does not work for applications or devices that are
not proxy-aware, and the third option requires the support of CISCO hardware.
Option two was chosen to meet the requirements R2 and R4. The diagram
in Fig. 3.2 depicts the high-level network architecture of an implementation
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Figure 3.2: High Level Network Architecture of the Secure Web Gateway
Implementation
on a vDSL connection that supports Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet
(PPPoE).
3.4.2 System Architecture
A layered defence is needed to meet requirement R1. Fig. 3.3 shows the
sequence of filtering done by the Secure Web Gateway. The function of each
defence layer is described below:
IPS/IDS
IPS/IDS fulfils the role of network-based filtering and can classify the traffic
as it traverses through the Secure Web Gateway. Traffic classification provides











Figure 3.3: The Secure Web Gateway Block sequence
DLP ICAP filter
There are two ways to prvent the leakage of data in motion by using the Secure
Web Gateway. The first option is to use IPS/IDS to identify certain types of
data from the network traffic. The downside of using IPS/IDS is that it will
block all traffic to the same destination IP that triggered the rule. DLP rules
within IPS/IDS are usually set to alert only. The second option is to integrate
a third-party DLP solution with the Web Proxy through the use of ICAP
protocol.
URL filter
URL filtering is the core function of every Secure Web Gateway. The purpose
is to allow a network administrator to design a filtering policy based on the
website categories. A URL filter uses a pre-existing blacklist that is a collection
of URL lists grouped into different categories.
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DNS Blacklist
DNS is a critical infrastructure that a network administrator needs to have
control of. DNS can be used by attackers to deliver malware [72, 73] or at-
tackers may use it to control compromised PCs [74, 75]. DNS Blacklist is a
domain blacklist maintained by some organisations on the Internet.
DNS filter
As discussed in the previous chapter, DNS filters achieve blocking by prevent-
ing clients from resolving malicious domain names into IP addresses. DNS is
the most common rendezvous-based filtering type.
IP Blacklist
IP Blacklist, like DNS Blacklist is maintained by some organisations on the
Internet, and it contains a list of IP address that have been detected as gener-
ating malicious traffic. Some of the malicious traffic is communicated over IP
addresses instead of domain names, so IP Blacklist is also required.
3.4.3 Hardware Design
Because of the chosen network architecture above, the Secure Web Gateway
needs to be built upon a network firewall/router that is capable of routing
network traffic. Hence, the hardware needs to support the firewall solutions
currently available on the market and must also be able to be customised as
a Secure Web Gateway solution. The following two types of hardware were
considered: 1) Renting a VM from a cloud provider such as Google, Amazon
or Microsoft; and 2) A physical Intel-based hardware architecture that most
firewall/router software can run on. The first option offers the most re-usability
as a single implementation can be re-used easily across multiple premises, but
the downside is the performance impact of routing all the traffic from the on-
premise network through the cloud network. Table 3.1 provides a comparison
between the Cloud VM and Physical Device. Both options can satisfy the
requirements above. This implementation was done using a physical device,
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but the design can be easily ported to a cloud VM for other usage scenarios.
Appendix B documents the hardware and software components along with
the configurations that were used in an implementation on a residential vDSL
connection.
Table 3.1: Comparison of cloud VMs and physical device
Cloud VM Physical Device
Re-Usability High Low
Performance Impact High Low
Cost High operational cost
but low initial cost
High Initial cost of
buying the hardware +
small ongoing
operational cost such as
electricity and hardware
maintenance
Scalability Highly scalable Limited to what physical
hardware can offer









In this chapter, a Secure Web Gateway implementation is tested using a frame-
work based on a subset of the testing methodology developed by the NSS Labs
[76]. Refer to Appendix A for the technical details of the testing framework.
The challenge of the testing is to find reputable known-good or known-bad
sites that the test result can be compared against, and there is simply no sin-
gle source of truth to determine whether a website is malicious or benign. After
research, Google Safe Browsing and the Web of Trust were chosen to build the
control group for the following reasons: 1) Both offer API that allows the use
of a script to check the reputation of a website automatically; and 2) Both data
sets are compiled from a substantial amount of data. Thus, the assumption
of this experiment is that both sources provide close-to-accurate information
about the reputation of a website. The final result is further compared with
testing results against a Sophos UTM implementation, which is a commercial
Secure Web Gateway freely available for home or personal use [77]. Sophos
UTM is enabled for Intrusion Prevention, Web Filtering and Advanced Threat
Protection. Web filtering is specifically configured for blocking malicious cate-
gories only. Sophos UTM is tested using the same framework as the one used
for testing our own implementation. Only a sample of data is included; the full
data set is available on the Cyber Security Researchers of Waikato (CROW)
website: https://crow.org.nz/people/jeffrey.
1. Google Safe Browsing is a blacklist service run by Google that lists
the web resources that contain malware, phishing, or unwanted software
48
that is either deceptive or hard to uninstall or sites that have been com-
promised [78]. Google Safe Browsing is used by more than 1 billion
people all over the world and discovers over 50,000 malware sites and
90,000 phishing sites every month.
2. Web of Trust (MyWOT) was founded in 2006 and by 2013, it had
over 100 million downloads. MyWOT provides a website reputation and
review service that gives users the ability to provide a rating to a web-
site through a browser add-in. Its data is based on a combination of
crowdsourced reviews and data from other sources [79].
4.1 URL Filter Testing
The aim of this test is to determine the effectiveness of the URL filtering
capability. The script attempts to access the Alexa Top one million sites
through the Secure Web Gateway [80] and records the result of the access based
on the response it gets. Table 4.1 shows the first 20 sites of the one million list
that are being tested. The script starts with resolving the DNS of a site to an
IP address. If the Secure Web Gateway blocks the site, the IP address should
be resolved into an IP address assigned by the Secure Web Gateway as shown
in Table 4.2. Next, the script attempts to access the site using the script and
then inspects the response and the returned status code. The result is then
classified according to the returned status code and the response body of the
request. The result of the access should equal one of these three states: allow,
denied or unknown. The final result is cross-referenced to the test results using
both Google Safe Browsing API and Web of Trust API.
4.1.1 Google Safe Browsing Comparison
Table 4.3 shows the first thirty sites in the Alexa top one million that were
classified as unsafe by Google Safe Browsing and Table 4.4 shows the number
of sites in each threat type. When comparing this result against the test results
using the Secure Web Gateway, as shown in Fig. 4.1, 30% of unsafe websites
blacklisted by Google Safe Browsing API were also blocked by the Secure Web
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Gateway, 60% were allowed to pass through the Secure Web Gateway, and
10% were unknown, which means they were either unreachable or inaccessible
through the Secure Web Gateway at the time of testing. When this result
is further compared with the result of access through the Sophos UTM, both
results are similar. As shown in Fig. 4.2, 798 unsafe websites were not blocked
by Sophos UTM, and 864 websites were not blocked by the Secure Web Gate-
way. The Secure Web Gateway had a slightly higher miss rate. If one extends
the blocking categories to include questionable categories like Parked Domain,
Illegal Software, Suspicious URLs, Potentially Unwanted Programmes, and
hacking/computer crimes, one can see a decrease in the percentage of miss-
blocked websites to about 40%, down from the original 60%. Tables 4.5 and
4.6 show the access results of the first thirty unsafe websites through Sophos
UTM and our Secure Web Gateway. swg filter type column depicts the type
of filtering engine that was triggered. The result column shows that access is




















Sophos UTM Our SWG
Figure 4.2: Unsafe Websites not detected by Sophos UTM vs. our Secure Web
Gateway
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Table 4.2: OpenDNS & pfBlockerNG Block Page IP
Name IP Address
pfBlockerNG block page 10.10.10.1
Domain List Block Page 146.112.61.104
Botnet Block Page 146.112.61.105
Content Category Block Page 146.112.61.106
Malware Block Page 146.112.61.107
Phishing Block Page 146.112.61.108
Suspicious Response Block Page 146.112.61.109
Security Integrations Block Page 146.112.61.110
4.2 False-Positive Testing
This test is designed to test the Secure Web Gateway’s ability to identify
and allow legitimate traffic while maintaining protection against malicious
traffic. The test methodology is similar to URL filtering, but the result
is cross-referenced to the website reputation provided by the Web of Trust.
Web of Trust classifies websites into different categories, and for each as-
signed category, the Web of Trust also computes a confidence value for it.
The higher the confidence value, the more reliable the category assignment
is. Out of the one million websites tested, only 347677 websites had a cat-
egory assigned. Amongst the websites that have a category assigned, 6793
websites were blocked by the Secure Web Gateway. However, it is surprising
to learn that out of the websites blocked by the Secure Web Gateway, 5059
sites have the category ID 501 (Good site) which equates to more than 70%
false-positives. However, after analysing the cumulative distribution of the
confidence value of each assigned category as shown in Fig. 4.3, more than
95% of the assigned 501 category sites had a confidence value less than 60. Ac-
cording to the Web of Trust, a confidence value greater 60 is considered to be a
reliable rating. Based on this calculation, the false-positive rate approximately
3.9%. The result is also compared with the test results of access through the
Sophos UTM; as shown in Fig. 4.4, both display a similar false-positive rate.
If one extends the blocking categories to include questionable categories, as
shown in Fig. 4.5, the false-positive rate is increased to about 15%, more than
three times higher than without questionable categories. Table 4.7 and 4.8
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Figure 4.3: CDF Confidence Value of benign websites blocked by SWG
show websites blocked by our Secure Web Gateway and Sophos UTM with
WOT Category ID 501 and confidence value greater than 60.
4.3 Exploit Testing
This test focuses on client-side initiated attacks because the main function
of the Secure Web Gateway is to protect the outbound traffic generated by
the end-user device. This test leverages the Metasploit framework, a tool
for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine
[81]. This includes exploits such as reverse shell, a bind shell that allows an
attacker to execute arbitrary commands, install a malicious payload and render
the system unresponsive. In this testing, a Windows 7 VM was setup to run
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security categories only
extended categories
Figure 4.5: CDF Confidence Value of benign websites blocked by using
security-only categories vs extended categories
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on a virtual server hosted in the cloud. A reverse tcp payload was created
using the Metasploit framework and configured to connect back to a custom
port of the virtual server in the cloud. The payload (EXE) file was delivered
via a manual transfer method. The payload file was first compressed with a
password to evade AV detection during the transfer. The payload was then
manually run on the local Windows 7 machine, and the traffic between the local
Windows 7 machine and the Metasploit server in the cloud was monitored
on the Secure Web Gateway. With the initial setup, both My Secure Web
Gateway and Sophos UTM failed to detect and block the traffic. After a few
exploitations, it was discovered that setting IPS Policy to Maximum Detection
would allow the IPS to include the required signatures to detect this malicious
traffic. Maximum Detection policy contains vulnerabilities with a CVSS score
of at least 7.5, published after 2005 or later, and also critical malware and
exploit kit rules. In this testing, no performance degradation was observed as
a result of choosing this setting. However, changing the setting to ”Maximum
Detection” also led to a much higher false-positive rate. The false-positive rate
is reduced by using the suppression list and the SID Management Configuration
files to disable rules that triggered false-positive alerts. These settings need
to be tuned according to the traffic pattern of the network and cannot be
set-and-forget.
4.4 DLP Testing
This provides a summary of the steps that had been followed to test the effec-
tiveness of the MyDLP solution.
1. Created a policy in MyDLP to detect Social Security Numbers and Credit
Card Numbers
2. Created a spreadsheet or word document populated with names, social
security numbers and credit card numbers. Sample data was downloaded
from the DLPTest website [82].
3. Used the HTTP Post function on the DLPTest website to upload the
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document prepared in step 1 [82].
4. Checked the Logs in the MyDLP admin interface to determine whether
the traffic had been detected.
The testing was completed successfully with traffic violating the policy
correctly detected by MyDLP. However, sometimes, MyDLP only reported
the detection of one information type even when the sample data contained






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This section discusses the gaps and challenges identified in this research. The
main challenge in content-filtering is the balance between false-positive and
false-negative rate. As the testing showed in Section 4.2, increasing the number
of blocking categories increased the detection rate, but at the same time, it also
increased the false-positive rate. There is no silver bullet for dealing with this
issue due to the organic and volatile nature of Web resources. In Sections 5.2
and 5.3, the author concludes that a Secure Web Gateway cannot be used alone
to defend against DLP and APT. A Secure Web Gateway needs to cooperate
with other countermeasures to form multiple layers of defence; this is the best
way to thwart these problems.
5.1 Gaps in the content filtering factors
5.1.1 Network-based filtering
There are several challenges presented in the network-based filtering.
• URL filtering is useful for detecting known threats but is ineffective
against advanced threats and zero-day attacks. It is also becoming dif-
ficult to manage because of the exponential growth rate of new Internet
sites.
• Port-based and signature-based malware detection are very cost-effective
and accurate methods to detect known and static malware but are very
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inefficient against advanced malware that leverages zero-day vulnerabil-
ities. Other behaviourally and statistically based detection techniques
can compensate for the shortfall in detection capability but have low
accuracy and high false-positives.
5.1.2 Rendezvous-Based Filtering Type
The rendezvous-based filtering method is one of the easiest implementations
of Internet filtering, but it is often accompanied by some collateral damage.
For example, DNS injection is a very popular mechanism for filtering Internet
traffic, but the enforcing party is often unaware of the collateral damage of
such filtering may potentially affect users outside of its network. This is solely
because the DNS traffic is routed through the censored network. A famous
example happened in 2010 in which queries from Chile were routed through a
Chinese root server [83].
5.1.3 Endpoint-Based Filtering Type
The main challenge of Endpoint-Based filtering is that it requires the cooper-
ation of the endpoints. The problem is exacerbated when there is a diverse
set of endpoints such as mobile, laptop, desktop, and tablet. It is a challenge
to deploy the required software update to all endpoints, and it is subject to
circumvention if users possess administrative privileges on the endpoint.
A Secure Web Gateway is primarily operated in proxy mode, which pro-
vides full control over the TCP connection. However, a proxy-based Secure
Web Gateway can cause user experience degradation issues for the following
reasons: 1) Not all applications and devices can operate in proxy mode espe-
cially modern devices like Internet of Things (IoT), smartphones and tablets;
and 2) It can introduce unwanted latency in web application performance,
which is especially noticeable in latency-sensitive applications such as web con-
ferencing and voice over IP (VoIP) software. The latency issue is exacerbated
by the increasing use of encryption in web traffic and the need to decrypt and
intercept encrypted traffic. A Secure Web Gateway needs to be transformed
into an overarching security platform by integrating with different types of
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filtering and security controls such as a network-based firewall.
5.2 Gaps in the DLP factors
DLP cannot be just ”set and forget” and must involve business stakeholders
to develop a strategy for how an organisation should address data leakage
[84]. DLP techniques used within the Secure Web Gateway are primarily
based on rules and dictionaries that are suitable for structured data. More
advanced DLP detection such as statistical and conceptual analysis often needs
to be offloaded to other dedicated DLP solution via a protocol like Internet
Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP). However, most detection techniques for
unstructured data have a high false-positive rate.
5.3 Gaps in the APT factors
Defending against APT requires improvement of the overarching security of an
organisation. Although a Secure Web Gateway can inspect, filter and monitor
inbound content and outbound Internet Web communications, it is still oper-
ated in a silo and does not exchange information with other networks, edges,
endpoints and data security systems. This can reduce an organisation’s ability
to prevent, detect and respond to an APT [85]. For example, an organisation
can integrate its Secure Web Gateway with the SIEM to improve contextual
awareness and provide a higher-level alert management capability.
5.4 Gaps in the SSL filtering factors
SSL Interception Proxy breaks the privacy of encryption and the issue is exac-
erbated when the public subCA is used [86]. The following risks are introduced
by an interception proxy:
• Legal Exposure An organisation that implements an interception proxy
may face increased legal exposure as employees may expect privacy in
communication with confidential websites such as banking or health web-
sites.
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• Increased threat surface SSL Interception Proxy becomes a single
point where all encrypted sessions can be viewed in plain text. Attackers
can compromise the interception proxy to inspect and potentially modify
plain-text contents of any encrypted sessions.
• Decreased cipher strength As the cipher suites of client and server
SSL sessions are negotiated independently, the strength of the cipher of
the SSL session is determined by the strongest cipher supported by the
interception proxy. There is a possibility that the interception proxy
supports a weaker cipher than the client endpoint.
• Transitive Trust SSL Interception Proxy introduces a phenomenon
called ”transitive trust” in which if the SSL client trusts the SSL proxy
and the SSL proxy trusts the SSL server, then the SSL client trusts the
SSL server. In [51], Jarmoc and Unit suggest that ”transitive trust” can
expose several flaws in the operation of the SSL protocol.
Direct Validation of Certificates (DVCert) [87], SSL/TLS Session-Aware
User Authentication [88, 89], the proposed TLS-SRP protocol [90], and Google’s
proposal of Certificate Pinning [91] are all security countermeasures to combat
MITM attacks. These may stop the legitimate SSL proxy server from access-
ing encrypted websites as the communication may be detected as an MITM
attack.
5.4.1 BlindBox
BlindBox offers a potential solution to the aforementioned issues, but the pro-
posed architecture requires cooperation from both client and server endpoints
and additional computational overhead for the client endpoint for computing
hashes of traffic segments, which make it difficult for the current browser and
web server to adopt this method.
5.4.2 PRI
PRI offers a simpler solution with lesser overheads than BlindBox. However,
the downside is that it depends on the support of a specific type of hardware
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- Intel Software Guard Extensions. SGX was introduced in 2015 with Intel
Core microprocessors based on the Skylake microarchitecture. At the time of
writing, it is still difficult to find suitable hardware that supports the SGX
feature and also meets other criteria. Also, in [92], Costan and Devadas raised
a concern with a control feature in SGX that requires software developers to
enter a business agreement with Intel. For the author of the software to take
advantage of the SGX’s protection, the software must obtain a SGX attestation




This chapter discusses the key outcomes and value of this research and con-
cludes by suggesting potential future work in the field of intercepting SSL/TLS
encrypted traffic.
6.1 Summary
This project achieved the majority of its goals, with some gaps and challenges
as discussed in the previous chapter. The experiment showed that the pro-
totype can achieve similar effectiveness to the other commercial alternatives.
This is done by leveraging open-source and publicly available information such
as DNS/IP blacklists, IPS/IDS, integrated DLP solution, URL filters, and DNS
filters. The prototype created in this research had only a 4% higher miss rate
than the commercial alternative. However, the conundrum is that reducing
the miss rate by blocking questionable websites would also increase the false
positive rate, thus blocking legitimate sites. This study found that the DLP
function in a Secure Web Gateway is often delivered through Integrated DLP
as opposed to Enterprise DLP. A Secure Web Gateway monitors network traffic
as data traverses through it and applies DLP techniques to identify any data
leakage. This implementation integrated with a third-party DLP solution via
ICAP protocol and successfully identified leakage of items such as credit card
numbers and social security numbers. Also, it found the DLP can sometimes
lead to a high false positive rate when certain techniques like statistical and
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contextual/conceptual analysis are used. A Secure Web Gateway is just part
of the solution to thwart APT. A Secure Web Gateway can break an APT life-
cycle by controlling the delivery of malware via the Web and communication
with Command and Control servers. This research demonstrated the ability
of the prototype to stop the execution of a Metasploit reverse shell by suc-
cessfully identifying and blocking the communication from the reverse shell to
the control server. This was achieved by installing the IPS/IDS on the Secure
Web Gateway with correct signature to identify a malicious traffic pattern.
To date, the most effective way to inspect SSL/TLS encrypted traffic is by
leveraging SNI filtering and adaptive security models. SNI filtering can stop
the establishment of an SSL tunnel with known malicious websites but can-
not detect malicious content delivered through benign websites. The adaptive
security model is a way to achieve a balance between privacy and security by
only decrypting privacy-insensitive sites using the MITM technique. This im-
plementation only partially achieves this goal by using an SSL proxy with an
access control list and is unable to implement a full adaptive security model.
Lastly, a guideline on how to implement a Secure Web Gateway in a work-
place to avoid unnecessary risk of legal liability and regulatory compliance is
provided, and along with a summary of key elements that should be included
in a company’s computer use policy. A well-implemented computer use policy
is the key to the successful implementation of a Secure Web Gateway.
This thesis has also established the possibility of using commodity hard-
ware and open source technologies at a relatively low cost, yet still achieving
the same effectiveness as other commercial alternatives. This enables anyone
who has some IT background to set one up for home or small business use.
The system architecture developed by this research can also be easily trans-
ported to a cloud platform, making it possible to share the same Secure Web
Gateway between multiple businesses or households. Another advantage of
having the Secure Web Gateway in the cloud is the ability to protect mobile
traffic over 3G/4G or public WIFI networks. The full implementation details
are described in Appendix. B. Finally, the testing framework developed by
this research can also be used to verify the effectiveness of other Secure Web
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Gateway implementations. The system architecture of the test environment
and the description of each artefact is included in Appendix A.
6.2 Future Work
The biggest challenge is SSL-filtering, which remains an open issue as discussed
in Section 5.4. As the industry is pushing harder and harder for encrypting all
web resources with SSL/TLS encryption, this can potentially render the Secure
Web Gateway useless. During the writing of this thesis, the specification for
TLS 1.3 was released, and MITM is no longer possible with TLS 1.3 [94]. Major
browsers like Chrome and Firefox are displaying a warning about insecure login
pages [95]. Many reports showed that HTTPs adoption has doubled in the last
12 months [96, 97]. Although both the BlindBox proposed by Sherry et al.
in [56] and PRI proposed by Schiff and Schmid in [58] offer some promise in
solving this conundrum, they all have some limitations and further work is
required to make these solutions ready for production use.
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The test environment consists of the following components: 1) An SQLite
database for storing the test result data; 2) PowerShell scripts for executing
various test cases. The test scripts need to be run on a machine behind the
Secure Web Gateway with all traffic passing through it. The following com-
ponents are required to be installed on the test machine.
• Windows Management Framework This is the required component
for running a PowerShell script. It is recommended to upgrade it to the
latest version available for the OS.
• Precompiled SQLite Binaries for .NET This is downloadable from
the SQLite website and is needed for the PowerShell script to work with
the SQLite database.
• Database Managers SQLite Studio was used for managing most of DB
tasks [98]. SQLite Database Browser was used for the export function
due to a bug in the SQLite Studio [99].
• Precompiled SQLite Binaries for Windows This is the CLI tool
for managing the SQLite database. The import function in the CLI is
much faster than importing the CSV file using the GUI tool. The testing
was executed on two different machines and hence the need of using the
import function to consolidate records in two databases.

































Figure A.1: Test Environment System Architecture
1. Runjob.ps1 populates the queue with ID of each URL being tested.
2. Runjob.ps1 creates multiple jobs. The $maxConcurrentJobs variable
controls the maximum number of jobs.
3. All jobs run concurrently retrieving and removing ID from the queue.
Each job will run continuously until no more ID left in the queue.
4. Each job calls the test-url-pfsense.ps1 script and passes the ID being
tested to the script.
5. Test-url-pfSense.ps1 retrieves the actual URL from the database based
on the ID it receives from the Runjob.ps1 script.
6. Test-url-pfsense.ps1 tests the URL using the testing logic defined in the
script.
7. Test-url-pfsense.ps1 writes the test result into the database.
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A.1 SQL Tables
main table for storing the test result data.
swg filter result
1 PRAGMA foreign_keys = off;
2 BEGIN TRANSACTION;
3
4 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS swg_filter_result;
5
6 CREATE TABLE swg_filter_result (
7 swg_filter_result_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT
8 UNIQUE
9 NOT NULL,
10 url_key INTEGER NOT NULL,
11 swg_filter_type TEXT NOT NULL,
12 swg_filter_result INTEGER NOT NULL,





18 DROP INDEX IF EXISTS swg_filter_result_index;
19





25 PRAGMA foreign_keys = on;
table for storing the domains or URLs of the websites to be tested
url
1 PRAGMA foreign_keys = off;
2 BEGIN TRANSACTION;
3
4 -- Table: url
5 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS url;
6
7 CREATE TABLE url (
8 url_key INTEGER NOT NULL
9 PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT
10 UNIQUE,






17 PRAGMA foreign_keys = on;
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table for storing the domains or URLs of the websites that are blacklisted by
the Google Safe Browsing
url safebrowsing
1 PRAGMA foreign_keys = off;
2 BEGIN TRANSACTION;
3
4 -- Table: url_safebrowsing
5 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS url_safebrowsing;
6
7 CREATE TABLE url_safebrowsing (
8 url_safebrowsing_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY
9 NOT NULL,
10 url_key INTEGER NOT NULL,






17 -- Index: url_safebrowsing_index
18 DROP INDEX IF EXISTS url_safebrowsing_index;
19






26 PRAGMA foreign_keys = on;
table for storing the data of URL to category and confidence value assigned
by the Web of Trust.
url category
1 PRAGMA foreign_keys = off;
2 BEGIN TRANSACTION;
3
4 -- Table: url_category
5 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS url_category;
6
7 CREATE TABLE url_category (
8 url_category_id INTEGER NOT NULL
9 PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT
10 UNIQUE,
11 url_key INTEGER NOT NULL,
12 category_identifier INTEGER NOT NULL,






18 -- Index: url_category_index
19 DROP INDEX IF EXISTS url_category_index;
20






27 PRAGMA foreign_keys = on;
A.2 PowerShell Scripts
This is a wrapper script that utilises the queue and job to achieve multi-
threading and running the testing on multiple websites concurrently. This
helps to increase the speed of the testing.
runjobs.ps1
1 $maxConcurrentJobs = 10;
2
3
4 $queue = [System.Collections.Queue]::Synchronized( (New-Object System.Collections.Queue) )







12 Get-Job -State Completed | Remove-Job
13 if( $queue.Count -gt 0)
14 {
15 #Start-Sleep (Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 5)
16 $j = Start-Job -Filepath C:\scripts\test-url-pfsense.ps1 -ArgumentList
$queue.Dequeue()↪→
17 Register-ObjectEvent -InputObject $j -EventName StateChanged -Action {
RunJobFromQueue; Unregister-Event $eventsubscriber.SourceIdentifier; Remove-Job












This is the actual test script that is responsible for executing different test






5 $AllProtocols = [System.Net.SecurityProtocolType]’Ssl3,Tls,Tls11,Tls12’










15 public class ServerCertificateValidationCallback
16 {


























42 param( $new_uri )
43 $test_date = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
44
45 try {
46 $dnsresponse = Resolve-DnsName $new_uri
47 if($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("10.10.10.1")) {
48 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’DNSBL’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
49 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
50 }
51 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.104")) {
52 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Domain List Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
53 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
54 }
55 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.105")) {
56 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Botnet Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
57 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
58 }
59 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.106")) {
60 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +





61 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
62 }
63 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.107")) {
64 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Malware Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
65 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
66 }
67 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.108")) {
68 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Phishing Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
69 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
70 }
71 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.109")) {
72 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +









76 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +









81 $test_date = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
82 $response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $new_uri -TimeoutSec 20
83
84
85 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +










91 if ($_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__ -eq 403) {
92 $test_date = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
93 $_.Exception.Response.GetResponseStream()
94 $reader = New-Object System.IO.StreamReader($result)
95 $reader.BaseStream.Position = 0
96 $reader.DiscardBufferedData()
97 $responseBody = $reader.ReadToEnd();
98 if ($responseBody -like "*pfSense*") {
99 if ($responseBody -like "*Target group*") {
100 $start_pos = $responseBody.IndexOf("<b> Target group: </b>
") + 25↪→
101 $length = ($responseBody.IndexOf("<b> URL:") -11) -
$start_pos↪→
102 }
103 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’" + $responseBody.Substring($start_pos, $length) + "’, 1,




104 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
105 }
106 else {
107 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’url’, 0, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +










113 elseif($_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__ -eq 503) {
114 if ($_.ErrorDetails -like "*(13) Permission denied*") {
115 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’IPBL’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +




116 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
117 }
118 else {
119 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’url’, 0, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +









125 if($_.Exception.Message -eq "The operation has timed out.") {
126 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)





129 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’url’, 0, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +













139 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’DNS Not Exist’, 2, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→





145 Add-Type -Path "C:\Program Files\System.Data.SQLite\2015\bin\System.Data.SQLite.dll"
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146 $con = New-Object -TypeName System.Data.SQLite.SQLiteConnection
147 $con.ConnectionString = "Data Source=C:\temp\websites.sqlite"
148 $con.Open()
149 $offset = 0




154 $sql.CommandText = "SELECT url.target from url where url_key = $($url_key);"
155 #echo £sql.CommandText
156
157 $adapter = New-Object -TypeName System.Data.SQLite.SQLiteDataAdapter $sql
158 #we create the dataset
159 $data = New-Object System.Data.DataSet
160 #and then fill the dataset
161 [void]$adapter.Fill($data)
162
163 $target = $data.Tables[0].Rows[0].target
164
165 $uri = $target
166
167 $test_date = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
168
169 try {
170 $dnsresponse = Resolve-DnsName $uri
171 if($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("10.10.10.1")) {
172 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’DNSBL’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
173 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
174 }
175 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.104")) {
176 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Domain List Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
177 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
178 }
179 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.105")) {
180 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Botnet Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
181 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
182 }
183 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.106")) {
184 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +









188 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Malware Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
189 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
190 }
191 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.108")) {
192 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +
$url_key + "’, ’OpenDNS-Phishing Block’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’0’, ’pfSense’);"
↪→
↪→
193 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
194 }
195 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.109")) {
196 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +





197 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
198 }
199 elseif($dnsresponse.IP4Address.Contains("146.112.61.110")) {
200 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +









205 $test_date = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
206 $response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -TimeoutSec 20
207
208
209 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key, swg_filter_type,
swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name) VALUES (’" +










215 if ($_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__ -eq 403) {
216 $test_date = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
217 $_.Exception.Response.GetResponseStream()
218 $reader = New-Object System.IO.StreamReader($result)
219 $reader.BaseStream.Position = 0
220 $reader.DiscardBufferedData()
221 $responseBody = $reader.ReadToEnd();
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222 if ($responseBody -like "*pfSense*") {
223 if ($responseBody -like "*Target group*") {
224 $start_pos = $responseBody.IndexOf("<b> Target group: </b> ")
+ 25↪→
225 $length = ($responseBody.IndexOf("<b> URL:") -11) - $start_pos
226 }
227 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’" + $responseBody.Substring($start_pos, $length) + "’, 1,




228 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
229 }
230 else {
231 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’url’, 0, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +









237 elseif($_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__ -eq 503) {
238 if ($_.ErrorDetails -like "*(13) Permission denied*") {
239 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’IPBL’, 1, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +




240 $insert_output = $sql.ExecuteNonQuery()
241 }
242 else {
243 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’url’, 0, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +









249 if($_.Exception.Message -eq "The operation has timed out.") {
250 test-uri2 -new_uri "www.$($uri)"
251 }
252 else {
253 $sql.CommandText = "Insert into swg_filter_result (url_key,
swg_filter_type, swg_filter_result, swg_test_date, http_status_code, swg_system_name)
VALUES (’" + $url_key + "’, ’url’, 0, ’" + $test_date + "’,’" +























Based on the aforementioned findings, this section shows an implementation
of Secure Web Gateway.
To cater for home or small business usage scenario, a low power, low noise
(fanless), small form factor with multiple network ports PC was chosen for
this implementation. At the time of writing, there is no suitable hardware
in the market supports Intel Software Guard Extensions and also meet other
requirements. Fig. B.1 shows the pictures of a Qotom Mini PC used in this
implementation [100]. The hardware comes with Intel Celeron quad core 2GHz
CPU and supports memory up to 8GB which provides a reasonable amount
of resources to run the required functionalities. The motherboard is based
on the Intel chipset, and 4 x integrated Intel Ethernet controller. Intel based
hardware is compatible with most operating systems.
(a) Motherboard View (b) Front & Rear View
Figure B.1: A Mini PC with views from inside and outside
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B.1 Software Components
Because of the reasons above, most of the software components selected in this
implementation are either open source or affordable commercial add-ons that
can be easily integrated into the Secure Web Gateway.
B.1.1 pfSense
pfSense project started in 2004 as a fork of the m0n0wall project and now
has come with many features out-of-box that are essential for a Secure Web
Gateway implementation [101]. As a result, pfSense was chosen as the firewall
for this project. The first step is to configure the firewall to operate in the
bridge mode. In the bridge mode, the public IP address is assigned to the
interface on the firewall and the firewall will have the complete control over the
traffic coming in and going out of the network without other forms of Network
Address Translation. Fig. B.2 shows the configuration of a DSL router. As the
switch used in this implementation does not support VLAN tagging, VLAN 1
is used to disable the VLAN tagging. Next, create a VLAN interface bounded
to the external interface as shown in the Fig. B.3. VLAN ID is provided by
the ISP, and in this case, VLAN-10 is used by Spark NZ the ISP that provides
the Internet connection for this implementation. Finally, create a new PPP
interface by selecting PPPoE as the Link Type, VLAN interface set up in the
previous step as the Link Interface and entering the username and password
supplied by the ISP (Fig. B.4). Then add a new virtual interface to this newly
created PPPOE interface. Now, the firewall should try to authenticate with
the ISP and obtain a public IP address.
In this implementation, OpenDNS was chosen to extend the DNS protec-
tion capability by adding the Phishing and Malware/Botnet Protection fea-
tures [102]. Also, a firewall rule is added to block any outbound DNS traffic
from the Internal network. As shown in the Fig. B.5, add the OpenDNS
servers IP to the DNS Server Settings and then enable forwarding mode in
the DNS Resolver. It is also advisable to create a firewall rule to block all
outbound connection to DNS port (TCP/UDP 53) to prevent applications to
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Figure B.2: Spark VDSL router configuration
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Figure B.3: pfSense VLAN Configuration
Figure B.4: pfSense PPP Interface Configuration
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(a) DNS Server Setup in General Setup
(b) DNS Resolver Setting
Figure B.5: pfSense DNS Server Settings
bypass the local DNS server.
B.1.2 pfBlockerNG
pfBlockerNG is a package run on pfSense and is an IP and Domain Names
download manager. It can collect IPs and Domain Names from multiple
sources and then automatically create firewall rules to Deny, Permit or Match
the traffic [103]. When Squid proxy server operates in the transparent mode,
web traffic is intercepted before it is passed to the firewall and this will stop
the pfBlockerNG from blocking the IPs in the blacklists. To block traffic to
the blacklists IPs, perform the following steps: 1) Select both LAN and WAN
interface for Outbound Firewall Rules; 2) Enable floating rules so the firewall
can block traffic generated from the Squid proxy server.
The following IP Black lists were used:
1. Emerging Threats Compromised Hosts The list contains hosts that
are known to be compromised by bots, phishing sites, or spewing hostile
traffic.
https://rules.emergingthreats.net/blockrules/compromised-ips.txt
2. Emerging Threats Blocked IPs This list contains Spam nets identi-
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fied by [104] and top attackers listed by DShield [105].
https://rules.emergingthreats.net/fwrules/emerging-Block-IPs.txt
3. Spamhaus DROP lists These lists consist of netblocks that are hi-
jacked or leased by professional spam or cybercrime operations and are
used for dissemination of malware, trojan downloaders, or botnet con-
trollers
https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/edrop.txt
4. Talos Intelligence Blacklist Talos is an organisation that is the pri-
mary member of Cisco’s Collective Security Intelligence (CSI) ecosystem
and is dedicated in providing threat intelligences [106]. The list provides
a list of known malicious network threats.
http://talosintel.com/feeds/ip-filter.blf
5. DShield Recommended Block List This list summarises the top 20
attacking class C (/24) subnets over the last three days.
https://isc.sans.edu/block.txt
6. ISC Top 1000 Attack Source This list provides the top 1000 attacks
IPs in the last 30 days
https://isc.sans.edu/api/sources/attacks/1000/
7. The CI Army List The list sourced from information gathered from
the CINS system and contains IP address meet two criteria: 1) The
IP’s recent Rouge Packet score factor is very poor, and 2) It hasn’t yet
been identified as malicious by the InfoSec community. The list serves
as supplement and enhance to other lists.
http://cinsscore.com/list/ci-badguys.txt
8. Bambenek Consulting C2 List This list contains a master feed of
known, active and non-sinkholed Command and Control (C2) IP ad-
dresses.
https://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/c2-ipmasterlist.txt
9. ZeuS IP blocklist This blocklist contains all IPv4 addresses associated
with ZeuS Command and Control (C2) which are currently being tracked
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by Zeus Tracker. This list may contain some false-positives.
https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=badips
10. SSL IP Blacklist This list contains all IPs that SSLBL has seen in the
past 30 days being associated with a malicious SSL certificate.
https://sslbl.abuse.ch/blacklist/sslipblacklist.csv
11. SSL IP Blacklist Dyre botnet This list contains all IPs that SSLBL
has seen in the past 30 days being associated with a malicious SSL cer-
tificate used by Dyre botnet.
https://sslbl.abuse.ch/blacklist/dyre sslipblacklist.csv
12. Ransomware Tracker IP Blocklist This list contains IP addresses
that have been associated with Ransomware in the past 30 days.
https://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/downloads/RW IPBL.txt
The following DNS Blacklists were used:
1. DShield Suspicious Domains List These are lists provided by the In-
ternet Storm Centre. The lists contain suspicious domains with different
level of sensitivity. To reduce false-positives, only high level sensitivity
list is used.
https://isc.sans.edu/feeds/suspiciousdomains High.txt
2. Bambenek Consulting C2 List This is a master feed of known, active
and non-sinkholed Command and Control (C2) domain names
http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/c2-dommasterlist.txt
3. Bambenek Consulting DGA List This list contains all known Do-
main Generation Algorithm generated domains used by malware for do-
mains 2 days prior to 3days after the current data.
http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/dga-feed.gz
These blacklists provide a good layer of defence. However, it can potentially
introduce some false-positives or false-negatives. It is advisable to choose the
list carefully and not solely rely on the blacklist as the only defence. This guide
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provides a good starting point for configuring blacklist in the pfBlockerNG
[107].
B.1.3 Suricata
In this project, the author had evaluated two most popular open source in-
trusion detection and prevention system - Snort and Suricata. Snort has been
around since 1998 and has the largest community of users and copious amount
of documentation on the Internet. The main developer group behind the Snort
is Sourcefire, which is acquired by Cisco in 2013. In 2014, Cisco released Ope-
nAppID to the open source community for Snort. OpenAppID allows Snort
users to easily write a rule to detect, monitor and manage usage of thousands
of different applications in their networks [108]. The downside of Snort is that
it is single-threaded and does not support running the IPS in the Inline mode.
The true inline mode IPS sits in between the network interface card and the
OS kernel. All traffic can be evaluated, alerted or dropped in real-time. With-
out in-line mode, IPS uses the PCAP engine to generate copies of packets for
inspection as they traverse through the interface and hence some leakage of
packets can occur before IPS can determine if the traffic matches a rule. As a
result, there are some performance limitations within the current Snort archi-
tecture. The advantage of Suricata over Snort is its ability to operate in the
in-line mode and also the support of multi-threading, it can deliver a much
higher throughput than Snort on the hardware of the same capacity. Because
this implementation is designed to run in a home or small-office environment
with limited hardware resources, Suricata was chosen for this implementation.
Table B.1 provides a comparison between Snort and Suricata.
Suricata like Snort is also a rule based IPS/IDS and is compatible with
Emerging Threats rules and Snort VRT Rules. As shown in Fig. B.6, it
requires Oinkmaster Code to download Snort VRT rules. The code can be
obtained after registering an account at the Snort website. The paid subscrip-
tion can receive the rules immediately upon release, whereas the free version
will only receive the rules that are older than 30 days.
As the goal of this implementation is to protect the outbound traffic, a
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Table B.1: Snort vs Suricata
Snort Suricata
Developer Sourcefire, Inc. Open Information
Security Foundation
(OISF)
Availability Since 1998 Since 2009
Operating System Cross-platform Cross-platform
Threads Single-threaded Multi-threaded








Figure B.6: Suricata Global Settings
Suricata interface is created on the LAN interface to have the visibility of
internal source IP address. On the interface setting, there are two block modes
available - Legacy and Inline mode as shown in the Fig. B.7. The Inline mode
requires the network cards that support Netmap. Netmap is an extremely
fast and efficient packet I/O framework for both userspace and kernel clients.
The network cards in the hardware used in this implementation do support
Netmap. In [109], it details the instruction on how to setup Inline mode for
Suricata.
Suricata provides a powerful capability to detect malicious network traffic.
However, it is also not something can be set-and-forget. It is recommended
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Figure B.7: Suricata Block Mode
to start with alerting mode only and gradually tune the setting to suppress
rules that generate false-positive alerts. The following factors were considered
when choosing the different rulesets: 1) There are some emerging threats and
snort rulesets that are created based on the blacklists that have already been
used in pfBlockerNG. These rulesets were excluded to avoid double handling
and unnecessary performance overhead; 2) Avoid selecting rulesets that are
designed for scanning inbound traffic to servers such as IMAP or POP3 that
are not in use in the environment; 3)The events rulesets such as dns-events
or tls-event are designed to detect non-compliant traffic, and as result, they
may cause high numbers of false-positives. Disable these rulesets or suppress
individual rules within the ruleset that caused false positives. Table B.2 be-
low provides the summary of the configuration of rulesets and rules for this
implementation.
B.1.4 Squid
Squid is one of the oldest open source projects on the planet and has been
around since the early 1990’s. It is a fully-featured proxy offering rich access
control, authorization, and logging environment [110]. In the beginning, it was
often used for improving the Web performance, but lately combining with the
plug-in squidGuard, an URL redirector software, it can be used for categorising
websites and determine the action (allow, deny or whitelist) based on the
category [111]. The proxy server adds another layer of security and provides
the ability to filter the traffic between the client and server. The first step is
to enable transparent proxying on the Squid server. Many mobile applications
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Table B.2: Suricata Rules Configuration

























































do not support traditional proxy connection, and very few clients support SSL
proxy connections. Transparent proxying also improves the usability of the
proxy server considerably. As shown in the Fig. B.8, enable transparent mode
and also it may be required to bypass proxy for servers that are incompatible
with transparent proxying. It is likely to encounter some SSL sites that don’t
work with this configuration. It is also advisable to disable outgoing traffic to
TCP port 443 and 80 to make sure all network traffic are going through the
proxy server.
To enable SSL interception, create an internal certificate authority under
System → Certificate Manager → CAs. In the Squid on pfSense, there are
two SSL/MITM Mode: 1) Splice Whitelist, Bump Otherwise, and 2) Splice
All. Bump establishes a TLS connection to the server and then establishes
a TLS connection with the client using a mimicked server certificate. Splice
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Figure B.8: Squid Transparent Proxy Settings
creates a TCP tunnel without decoding the connection that allows the client
and server to exchange the data as if there is no proxy in between [112]. The
bump can be problematic and may not be able to access all SSL sites if the
sites are setup to detect and reject MITM SSL connection. Bump also requires
the CA certificate to be imported onto all devices. Splice was chosen for this
implementation as it provides basic site filtering using SNI field and at the
same time provides maximum compatibility for accessing SSL sites. Please
note content filtering feature such as Antivirus is not available in Splice mode.
The following configurations were used:
• SSL/MITM Mode: Splice All
• SSL Proxy Compatibility Mode: Intermediate. This modes provides
the maximum coverage including sites running TLS v1.0.
• DHParams Key Size: 2048 (default)
pfSense provides an interface to enable ClamAV Anti-Virus Integration via
C-ICAP. This can be enabled on the Antivirus tab. To test if the AV function
is functioning correctly, try downloading the test virus files from eicar website
here - http://www.eicar.org/85-0-Download.html.
squidGuard provides URL filtering capability, which can be used for control
of websites users can access. The blacklists are the heart of every URL filter.
There are a few free blacklists to choose from 1) Shalla’s Blacklist [113], and
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2) Université Toulouse blacklist collection [114]; and some commercial options
as well: 1) URLBlacklist.com; and 2) SQUIDBLACKLIST.ORG. The Shalla’s
Blacklist was chosen for this implementation.
B.2 MyDLP
In this implementation, we have chosen a DLP product called MyDLP [115].
MyDLP is an open source DLP solution which not only capable of monitoring
data in motion but also monitoring data at rest. MyDLP community Edition
can only be used to log the matched traffic and the paid/enterprise edition
waive this restriction. For the Secure Web Gateway, only the web rule type
is used to monitor and control traffic over HTTP or HTTPs. Other types of
rules such as mail rules, removable storage rules, removable storage inbound
rules, removable storage encryption rules, printer rules, screenshot rules and
API rules are outside of the scope of this implementation. In MyDLP, it can
apply a different action to the traffic when the traffic matches to a policy rule.
The table B.3 depicts the different actions available for the web rule.
Table B.3: MyDLP Rule Actions for Web Rule
Rule Action Description
PASS As the name suggests, it allows the information to pass
through without generation of any log entries.
LOG It allows information to pass through, but generates event
log.
ARCHIVE In addition to the log action, it archives a copy of the
information. Administrator can download the files from the
log interface.
BLOCK This action prevents information to pass through and
generates an event log.
QUARANTINE In addition to the Block action, it archives a copy of the
information.
There are many pre-existing information types available in MyDLP, or one
can create a custom information type by leveraging the built-in matcher func-
tion such as the function to match the source code expression or to match
document hashes. The installation of MyDLP can be done by either using the
MyDLP CD Image to install it on a physical or virtual machine or installing
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MyDLP on an Ubuntu server manually. This implementation has chosen the
option of using the CD image. Enter the configuration in Table. B.4 in the
Custom Options (Before Auth) of the advanced features of the SQUID config-
uration in pfSense.
Table B.4: SQUID Configuration for MyDLP
icap enable on
icap io timeout 30 minutes
icap preview enable off
adaptation send client ip on
icap service service req reqmod precache bypass=on icap://MyDLP Server IP or Hostname/dlp
adaptation access service req allow all
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